Intergroup Conflict and the Spread of the Bow and Arrow in the Salish Sea Region by Hanna, David
Western Washington University 
Western CEDAR 
WWU Graduate School Collection WWU Graduate and Undergraduate Scholarship 
Fall 2021 
Intergroup Conflict and the Spread of the Bow and Arrow in the 
Salish Sea Region 
David Hanna 
Western Washington University, davidhanna98012@yahoo.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwuet 
 Part of the Anthropology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hanna, David, "Intergroup Conflict and the Spread of the Bow and Arrow in the Salish Sea Region" (2021). 
WWU Graduate School Collection. 1069. 
https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwuet/1069 
This Masters Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the WWU Graduate and Undergraduate 
Scholarship at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in WWU Graduate School Collection by an 
authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu. 
 
   









Accepted in Partial Completion 
of the Requirements for the Degree 













Dr. Sarah, K. Campbell 
 
 





















In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a master’s degree at 
Western Washington University, I grant to Western Washington University the non-exclusive 
royalty-free right to archive, reproduce, distribute, and display the thesis in any and all forms, 
including electronic format, via any digital library mechanisms maintained by WWU. 
 
I represent and warrant this is my original work, and does not infringe or violate any rights of 
others. I warrant that I have obtained written permissions from the owner of any third party 
copyrighted material included in these files. 
 
I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of this work, including but not 
limited to the right to use all or part of this work in future works, such as articles or books. 
 
Library users are granted permission for individual, research and non-commercial reproduction 
of this work for educational purposes only. Any further digital posting of this document requires 
specific permission from the author. 
 
Any copying or publication of this thesis for commercial purposes, or for financial gain, is not 










   







A Thesis  
Presented to 
The Faculty of 






In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 









   
Abstract 
 
The bow and arrow is thought to have had a major impact on the introduction of social stratification in 
the Salish Sea region through increased use of individual hunting, mirroring similar patterns from other 
parts of North America, as well as being introduced in the Salish Sea region roughly contemporaneously 
with a period of increased intergroup violence. While the bow and arrow may primarily have been used 
as a tool for hunting, it was fully capable of being used as a weapon in intergroup and interpersonal 
conflict. Many of the features that made it a more effective individual hunting tool over the thrown 
spear or dart also making it a more efficient weapon against human targets. Given this, the introduction 
of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region had the potential to increase the violence and intensity of 
intergroup conflict in the Salish Sea region. In a prolonged period of low intensity conflict, the 
defensibility of a given location from attack would be an important factor in the choice to build at said 
location. I hypothesized that if the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region was a 
contributing factor to a period of escalating interpersonal and intergroup conflict, then it could be 
possible that villages would be built in more and more defensible locations the more prominent the use 
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Chapter One: Conflict and Change in the Salish Sea region 
The bow and arrow is thought to have had a major impact on the introduction of social stratification 
through increased use of individual hunting practices (Angelbeck 2009, Angelbeck and Cameron 2014). , 
as well as being introduced in the Salish Sea region roughly contemporaneously with a period of 
increased intergroup violence (Ames and Maschner 1999; Moss and Erlandson 1992.).  While the bow 
and arrow may primarily have been used as a tool for hunting, it was fully capable of being used as a 
weapon in intergroup and interpersonal conflict. Many of the features that made it a more effective 
individual hunting tool over the thrown spear or dart also making it a more efficient weapon against 
human targets. 
Given this, the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region had the potential to increase 
the violence and intensity of intergroup conflict. This could have the potential effect of promoting the 
waging of intergroup conflict as a means of gaining individual status, in much the same way that the 
bow and arrow empowered the use of individual hunting practices. In a prolonged period of low 
intensity conflict, the defensibility of a given location from attack would be an important factor in the 
choice to build at said location, particularly in the case of the larger winter village sites common in the 
region. If the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region was a contributing factor to a 
period of escalating interpersonal and intergroup conflict, then it could be possible that villages would 
be built in more and more defensible locations the more prominent the use of the bow and arrow was in 
the region.   
I will be examining this through the use of Wolf’s theory of modes of power (1990), showing how 
different actors within the societies of the Salish Sea region exercised agency at the interpersonal, 
intergroup, and society wide scales. The dataset I am using for this project is the set of dated projectile 
points assemblages complied by Rorabaugh for use in his dissertation research, paired with their 
associated archaeological site components.  I will be analyzing the relative defensibility of the site 
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components by analysis of key geographic features. I initially intended to do this using Martindale and 
Supernant’s (2009) method, but due to running into difficulties with the specific use of their 
methodology given the data available to me, I switched to Bocinsky’s (2014) method of calculating 
relative defensibility, which was capable of calculating the defensibility values of an entire area, rather 
than the component-by-component process of Martindale and Supernant (2009). 
Once this data is collected, I compare the relative defensibility values of the site components associated 
with specific points assemblages and the values of said points on a statistical index created by 
Rorabaugh (2015) building off the work of Hildebrandt and King (2012), to determine if the points are 
dart/spear points or arrow points. Comparing the relative defensibility and the proportion of arrow 
points in the assemblage should allow me to determine if there are any links or correlations between 
the two datasets. 
While there has been study of the changes in projectile points styles believed to signal the introduction 
of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region, in particular establishing the dates of 3500-2500ybp as 
the hypothesized period of the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region, (Rorabaugh 
2015; Rorabaugh and Fulkerson 2015), no analysis has been conducted which pairs the analysis of 
particular point assemblages and the general spatial positioning of their associated site components. By 
analyzing the relative defensibility of site components associated with specific projectile point 
assemblages, any resulting correlations could provide areas for further examination of the data on 
smaller subdivisions, such as the local geography of the site component combined with the subregion of 
the broader Salish Sea region. By combining these two analyses, I hope to provide a new perspective on 
the changes in material culture and the role that tool choice in the face of intergroup conflict potentially 
had in long-term societal changes in the prehistory of the Salish Sea region. 
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Understanding the nature of conflict in the precontact Salish Sea region is vital to reconstructing the 
pressures that impacted changes in the social structures and dynamics of the area. intergroup conflict, 
particularly the raids that took slaves, impacted social dynamics both within and between groups. 
Within groups, the practice of intragroup conflict was a means for preeminent political actors to 
maintain their dominance, both materially and socially (Angelbeck 2009). Between groups, armed 
conflict could be a cause for and expression of tensions, and the results of the conflict could influence 
further changes among the combatant groups. The Salish Sea region is an area with a significant oral 
record of conflicts being conducted (Costello 1895, Angelbeck and Mclay 2011), which has been backed 
up by the archaeological identification of fortified sites (Angelbeck 2009). The taking of slaves in 
particular would have had the potential to provide outsized economic benefit to the slave-taker, and 
increase their position in their community (Donald 1997; Ames 2001). Ethnographic records show that 
war leaders played an important role in society, and that those who had proven themselves as effective 
leaders in war were more likely to gain influence in their communities (Hancock 1860 and Costello 1895, 
in Angelbeck 2009). Due to the lack of a precontact written record in this area, archaeological 
investigation is one of the primary means through which the changing nature of armed conflict in the 
area can be determined. 
The procedures and activities associated with intergroup conflict are shaped and influenced by the 
weapons and defensive strategies available to combatant groups. Throughout the rest of North America, 
archaeological evidence has shown that the introduction of the bow and arrow to a given region can 
strongly coincide with other material changes that have been linked to changes in social organization 
and structure for the associated region (Grund 2017; Nichols and Vanpool 2015; Vanpool and O’Brien 
2013). Under these models, the adoption of the bow and arrow was a factor contributing to changes in 
hunting practices in favor of individual hunters over group hunting, which was a contributing factor 
aiding individual hunters in leveraging their positions to assume places of influence and power in their 
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communities. Much of the research relevant to the spread of the bow and arrow in the Salish Sea region 
and western North America has been conducted in the Great Basin region and the Columbia Plateau 
(Ames et al. 2010, Bettinger and Eerkins 1999, Hildebrandt and King 2012, Thomas 1978). This is perhaps 
unsurprising, given the close geographic proximity of these regions, and the possibility that contact of 
one form or another was not uncommon between them. 
Multiple experimental and ethnographical studies of different projectile point delivery methods have 
shown the bow and arrow as being both more accurate and quicker to use than the spear thrower, 
commonly known as the atlatl (Angelbeck and Cameron 2014). While the thrown spear and dart would 
still have had greater force, meaning they were more effective when attempting to bring down larger 
animals such as wapiti, this advantage would have been less important against smaller, human-sized 
targets capable of being felled by arrows. The benefits that the bow and arrow would have had over the 
spear thrower in hunting also applied to provide increased lethality in intergroup conflict (Angelbeck 
and Cameron 2014).   
While the spear throwers and bows themselves rarely survive to be preserved in the archaeological 
record, the lithic points that are associated with these technologies are commonly recovered from 
archaeological sites.  Using statistical indices, Hildebrandt and King (2012) have proposed a metric to 
determine the likelihood that a given projectile point was used with a spear thrower, or a bow and 
arrow. Rorabaugh (2015) used this index, which only applied to stemmed points, and developed a 
discriminate function analysis to apply a similar function to unstemmed projectile points, which are 
much more common in the Salish Sea region. This allows a more thorough analysis of the point 
assemblages in the Salish Sea region to be conducted.  
Lithic points may not themselves have always been used in intergroup conflict. However, their presence 
in assemblages reflects a baseline familiarity with their associated technology, showing that it is 
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plausible that points may have been specifically designed for intergroup conflict but are less likely to 
preserve in the archaeological record. For instance, wooden points and bone points designed to pierce 
armor were also in use, as reflected in the oral and archaeological record elsewhere along the 
Northwest Coast. (Angelbeck 2009; Buddenhagen 2011a; Lowery 1999). While a compete inventory of 
lithic, bone, and wooden points would be ideal for tracing the influences of the spread of the bow and 
arrow on material culture, as lithic points are the only ones that can reliably withstand the formation 
processes of most site types, the baseline familiarity with bow and arrow technology demonstrated by 
the presence of lithic points is sufficient for broad generalizations. 
While the weapons available to potential combatants are an important aspect of how intergroup conflict 
is conducted, the environment in which the conflict takes place is equally important, as it will dictate the 
forms of conflict that are more or less effective. Both the ethnographic and archaeological record 
indicate that groups in the Salish Sea region based their villages and other sites in defensible locations, 
and at certain points in time, further modified the landscape using fortification to prevent attacks from 
outside groups, both local groups and those from elsewhere in the Northwest Coast region (Angelbeck 
2009). In periods of time where intergroup conflict was becoming more prevalent, the defensibility of a 
site location would become more important.  
 
In previous research into intergroup conflict and its effects on the societies of the Salish Sea region, 
there has been a trend to downplay evidence of physical conflict, and instead suggesting ceremonial 
combat or fulfillment of some other role in a society (Fisher 1976; Angelbeck 2009). This examination of 
warfare in the Salish Sea must reject the notion that warfare and the material goods associated with it 
were wholly or primarily ceremonial. Angelbeck (2009) has examined the ethnographic accounts and 
compiled numerous instances of groups in the Salish Sea region and elsewhere in the Pacific Northwest 
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taking both offensive and defensive action, instead of merely engaging in ceremonial conflict (Angelbeck 
2009; Boas 1889; Elmendorf 1993; Buddenhagen 2011a). While it is entirely plausible that some aspects 
of material culture associated with intergroup conflict could be used in a ceremonial context, this does 
not negate the potential association with more direct conflict. This association with conflict can be 
extended to whole sites and their associated landscapes as well.  Attempting to better understand the 
potential for defensibility that sites and locations possess provides a more detailed picture of the factors 
that might have been considered in the decision-making processes of combatant groups. The relative 
defensibility of sites on the Salish Sea and the broader Northwest Coast region was first examined by 
Martindale and Supernant (2009), They examined several key metrics of a site that contributed to its 
defensibility, and combined them to provide an overall index for the defensibility of the site. Their 
method was further refined by Bocinsky (2014), who shifted from a vector-based to a raster-based 
method of calculation., I have created a raster for the Salish Sea region, showing the relative 
defensibility, as shown by combining the relative elevation and visibility, of the sites in the region.  
I applied the defensibility raster to the sites associated with a set of projectile point assemblages 
analyzed by Rorabaugh (2015), to identify correlations between the presence of points considered 
arrow points under Rorabaugh and Hildebrandt and King’s methods and the maximum defensibility of 
the associated sites. These two metrics together will aid in determining to what extent the spread of the 
bow and arrow in the Salish Sea region played a role in the record of increasing intergroup conflict at the 
end of the Marpole phase (2500-1000 BP). Changes in the way that intergroup conflicts were waged 
would have allowed for ambitious individuals to leverage their skill in intergroup conflicts to increase 
their prestige and wealth in their communities, bypassing the older social networks that would have 
limited their mobility previously. While intergroup conflict is rarely the primary or singular driver of 
change as observed in the archaeological record, it can be a catalyst for further social change, as actors 
within a society react to the effect that the conflict has had on their lived experiences. Conversely, other 
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changes may result in or increase the likelihood of intergroup conflict, and the conflicts thus joined may 
in turn play a role in shaping the environment that future conflicts are conducted in, thus creating a 
feedback loop of long-term change.  The reactions of individuals to both the background changes and 
the changes influenced by intergroup conflict would play into their decision-making processes, and 
impact how their decisions affected the decision-making processes of others, thus spreading the effects 
of the conflict beyond those directly involved. Even if the bow and arrow was already present in the 
Salish Sea region as early as the Locarno Beach Phase as suggested by Rorabaugh (2015), wider use of 
the bow and arrow in the Salish Sea region may have been one factor that fed into a larger set of 
cultural changes throughout the Marpole Phase, such as increased social stratification and material 
inequality (Croes and Hackenberger 1988), leading to the beginning of the Gulf of Georgia phase (1500 















   
Chapter Two: Theories of Conflict in the Pacific Northwest  
The archaeological study of conflict is especially vital to understanding the nature of intergroup conflict 
and associated cultural changes in societies that did not leave behind a written record, such as the 
inhabitants of the Salish Sea region. The archaeological study of warfare is usually conducted along four 
lines of inquiry, namely: tracing changes in settlement patterns, looking for signs of violence in human 
skeletal remains (Cybulski 1999; Lambert 2007), looking for iconography related to violence, and 
examining the weapons and other tools of conflict (i.e. shields, armor) themselves (Lambert 2002). 
Lambert also mentions the presence of fortifications and other defensive structures, but their presence 
can vary depending on the area in question. Given the material constraints of different areas, such as 
the lack of organic remains in areas that do not have the climate or environment to properly preserve 
them, the study of certain lines of evidence will be more or less relevant. In addition, different sorts of 
conflict could lead to different lines of evidence being more or less prominent, such as evidence of 
scalping or other trophy taking being prominent in areas where performance in conflict was a means for 
social advancement (Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 2007). While smaller-scale conflicts might have 
been relatively common, when the conflicts thus undertaken would go beyond the level of small scale 
disputes between individuals and small groups, it is also possible that certain noteworthy conflicts 
would enter into the oral record, especially if these conflicts involved groups from across the Salish Sea 
region (Angelbeck and Mclay 2011). 
The ways that a society conducted intergroup conflict would be affected by the other activities 
undertaken in that society. The peacetime expertise and experiences of individuals and groups would be 
the first areas of their lived experiences to be turned towards conflict in times of more intense crisis, 
such as weapons designed for hunting being turned on human targets. In addition, relationships and 
networks that were formed in other activities could potentially be leveraged to provide mutual defense 
in times of conflict (Borck et al. 2015). Therefore, any material change that had the potential to affect 
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both the individual experiences and societal relationships of combatant groups, such as the introduction 
of the bow and arrow, would also have the potential to change the intensity and frequency of 
intergroup conflict. 
Definitions of War and Conflict 
When discussing war and other forms of intergroup conflict, it is important to recognize that the term 
“warfare” has a complicated history when it comes to the description of combat taking place in societies 
with different levels of formal structural organization and geographic scale (Keeley 1996). While the 
societies of the Salish Sea region and the broader Northwest Coast region possessed complex social and 
cultural dynamics, they were not the top-down, organized states that are traditionally depicted as 
engaging in organized warfare. One of the simplest ways of delineating warfare from other conflicts 
would be the scale of the conflict, both in terms of the numbers of combatants, and the stakes of the 
conflict. The common archaeological definition of war is "a state or period of armed hostility existing 
between politically autonomous communities" (Lambert 2002 209). However, the term ‘warfare’ comes 
loaded with a broad set of assumptions and interpretations. Warfare is usually taken to imply conflict on 
a large scale, not only in terms of spatial extent, but also in terms of the number of people involved, 
often but not always limiting it to state-sized polities fighting each other. This is shown specifically in the 
literature concerning the Salish Sea region by the routine depiction of small-scale predatory raids, 
meaning armed action intended to seize goods or captives from rival groups, as the primary form of 
intergroup conflict (Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998).   While I will use the terms “Warfare” and 





   
The Salish Sea Region Within the Broader Northwest Coast Region 
The Salish Sea region is the area of the broader Northwest Coast that consists of the Puget Sound, the 
Strait of Georgia, the Strait of Juan de Fuca, their associated landforms, and river drainages. This area 
was and still is populated by groups of people who speak variants of the Coast Salish languages. 
Compared to the rest of the broader Northwest Coast region, the inhabitants of the Salish Sea region 
were long considered by anthropologists and archaeologists to be less materially and societally complex 
than their neighbors to the north, the Inhabitants of northern Coastal British Columbia, Haida Gwaii and 
the southern coast of Alaska (Suttles 1987; Haeberlin and Gunter 1930; Barnett 1955; Brown 1873-
1876). The archaeological and ethnographic records of these other areas of the Northwest Coast contain 
many well-documented instances of materials and locations associated with intergroup conflict, (Smith 
1907; Suttles 1951; Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998; Ames and Maschner 1999). 
While there were differences in the material and social cultures between Coast Salish and northern 
groups, interactions between the groups are ethnohistorically recorded. Most notably for this research, 
much of the literature that Angelbeck (2009) compiled deals with the Coast Salish response to predatory 
raids undertaken by groups living in the Northern Northwest Coast region, such as the Haida (Boas 1889; 
Elmendorf 1993). 
Angelbeck’s compilation of ethnographic sources filled a void in the literature around conflict in the 
Salish Sea region. One of the most noteworthy incidents he documents is the leadup to and events of a 
battle at Maple Bay between a raiding force from the Northern Northwest Coast region, and a coalition 
of different groups from the Salish Sea region (Angelbeck 2009; Angelbeck and McLay 2011; Elmendorf 
1993; Lugrin 1932). This account is noteworthy in that it emphasizes the social connections that were 
necessary to wage large-scale intergroup conflict, as well as the high level of coordination involved in 
the execution of battlefield strategies.  
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The presence of social and material structures in the societies of the Coast Salish similar to those of their 
northern neighbors mean that while the exact form that the social networks and material cultures 
associated with large scale intergroup conflict may have differed somewhat from those of the 
inhabitants of the Northern Northwest Coast region, they were not completely alien to each other. 
Given this, research concerning the conduct of intergroup conflict in the Northern Northwest Coast 
region may be worthy of consideration in attempting to reconstruct the practice of intergroup conflict as 
conducted by the inhabitants of the Salish Sea region. 
Ethnographic Accounts of Armed Conflict in the Salish Sea Region 
The Northwest Coast is an area that lacks a precontact written record, and thus any direct historical 
record of warfare or other acts of intergroup conflict beyond oral history and ethnography (Angelbeck 
and Mclay 2011; Boas 1889; Buddenhagen 2011b; Costello 1895; Curtis 1907-1930; Elmendorf 1993; 
Haeberlin and Gunter 1930), and the Salish Sea region is no exception to this. Therefore, evidence for 
armed conflict must be inferred from other sources such as artifacts or iconography of warfare, human 
remains, or changing patterns of settlement, including defensive landscape modifications such as 
fortification (Lambert 2002) Recent advances in GIS technology, allow an entire region to be analyzed to 
gauge its suitability for the construction of defensible sites. This can be synthesized with a deeper 
analysis of the tools and weapons available to a given society, with the combined effect of providing a 
rough approximation of where conflict may have taken place, and what weapons were used to conduct 
it. Ethnographic evidence for conflict in the Salish Sea region is complicated by the fact that much of it 
was documented during the exposure of the Native peoples to the increased presence of European 
colonizers throughout the 19th century (Boas 1889; Eells 1976,1985; Gibbs 1855,1877; Curtis 1907-1930; 
Costello 1895; Hancock 1860, 1927 Suttles 1989; Ray 1938). While this data may a valuable source 
especially in its accounts of changes in war material used by Native groups, such as the adoption of 
firearms, it must be remembered that the changes brought by the encroachment of European colonizers 
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were nothing short of apocalyptic to the peoples of the Northwest Coast. This was due not only to the 
direct actions of the colonizers, such as armed conflict and land appropriation, but also due to the 
epidemic diseases that they brought with them. These circumstances were like nothing that the groups 
of the Northwest Coast had ever experienced and would have impacted their reactions to armed 
intergroup conflict. 
While there had been earlier contacts on the outer Pacific Coast by both the Spanish and the British, 
most notably Captain James’s Cook’s 1775 contact at Nootka Sound on Vancouver Island, the Spanish 
were the first Europeans to make organized  and documented contact with the inhabitants of the Salish 
Sea region, beginning in 1790 with the arrival of the Quimper expedition (Wagner 1933), followed 
shortly thereafter by the Eliza Expedition of 1791 and the Galiano-Valdes expedition of 1792 (Wagner 
1933). However, it must also be noted that the fur trade was already well-established in the Salish Sea 
region prior to these expeditions, and their charting of the area only served to formalize what had been 
a reality for quite some time.  
The Spanish expeditions reported that the native inhabitants of the Salish Sea were generally friendly 
but showed capacity for violence in both the interpersonal and intergroup level in their interactions with 
them. Quimper reported the wearing of armor among some groups in the San Juan islands but was not 
witness to any inter-tribe violence personally (Wagner 1933). He described all the groups he 
encountered as warlike and treacherous, perhaps spurred on by violent incidents between his crew and 
groups of native men. 
Eliza seconded Quimper’s characterization of the native groups of the Strait of Juan de Fuca as ‘daring 
and warlike’, and the Galiano-Valdes expedition reported encountering parties of warriors with iron 
tipped arrows (Wagner 1933), although these encounters were generally friendly. While there was some 
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description of the houses and behaviors of the natives of the Salish Sea region, there was no systematic 
examination of defenses such as fortifications.   
 
The Spanish were joined in the region by the 1791 expedition of George Vancouver. As Britain and Spain 
were not at war at the time, Vancouver’s interactions with the Galiano Valdes expedition were friendly, 
and they partially collaborated in the exploration of the region, aiding each other in the charting of 
Vancouver Island (Vancouver 1798). Vancouver’s recorded interactions with the native peoples of the 
Salish Sea region primarily focused on their immediate interactions with his expedition, rather than any 
detailed ethnographic study like would be conducted later. Even so, he reported that while the groups 
of the region were generally friendly to himself and his crew, the bow and arrow, along with other 
weapons such as clubs, were universally present. An incident between his crew and a party of native 
men very nearly escalated to violence, only being defused with the firing of a swivel gun. Vancouver 
described a village with a fortified component north of the Fraser Delta, in the Strait of Georgia 
(Vancouver 1798), but as the village was abandoned there was no description of the activities which 
may have necessitated the fortification.  
American observers entered the region more and more after the settling of the boundary between the 
American and British claims in the region, especially with the founding of Seattle and the growth of 
euroamerican settlement in the region. The Wilkes expedition of the early 1840s was one of the first 
such groups of observers to take an active interest in the fortifications of the peoples of the Salish Sea 
region, recording fortifications on Whidbey Island (Miller 2011). 
George Gibbs was a prolific writer who documented many stories and reports of the peoples of the 
Salish Sea region, plus the accounts of British and American settlers and his own observations.   
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Gibbs reported that the presence of trench embankment sites and other fortifications was common 
knowledge among many of the British and American setters of the northwest coast region. However, 
Gibbs does not go into any detail regarding the exact locations of these embankments, nor does he 
partake in any assessment of their use as pertaining to intergroup conflict.  
Even more than this, Gibbs was able to provide direct documentation of intergroup violence taking place 
between different Coast Salish groups. Gibbs in particular showed differences between how conflict was 
prosecuted among the different groups of the Salish Sea region, compared to the conflict between a 
cost Salish group and a group from the outside, such as the Haida. As an example of different 
approaches in conflict with neighbors, Gibbs (1877) reports that it was customary for neighboring 
groups that were about to engage in conflict to meet at a specified location and on a specified day, and 
first attempt to solve the conflict through peaceful means. Only if this failed was violence resorted to. 
As one of the first anthropologists to enter rigorous academic study of the groups of the Salish Sea 
region, Franz Boas brought his views on the origins of conflict in ‘primitive’ societies to his observations 
of the Salish Sea region. Boas  considered armed conflict to be something taking place on all levels of 
societal complexity, and he drew a major distinction between the societies that he viewed as being 
incapable of large-scale peaceful organization and coexistence, such as the ‘bushmen’ of South Africa 
and the ‘Indians’ of south America, and the societies that were able to create a cohesive political and 
social unit in the face of conflict, such as the Zulu and the Iroquois (Boas 1912). He further extended this 
notion to the various racial and national identities of his day, claiming that it was the same base impulse 
that drove conflict at all levels of social organization Boas believed that war would be abolished once a 
political unit became large enough to encompass all the people of the world, the collective identity 
provided by such an identity giving cohesion to previously warring groups. 
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Given the demonstrated capacity for the peoples of the Salish Sea region to engage in coordination of 
both peaceful and violence activates across multi-village lines, Boas would have likely placed them in a 
category with the Zulu and Iroquois, rather than the ‘less developed’ peoples. It should go without 
saying that these interpretations of the way that conflict was conducted in these societies were heavily 
influenced by the so-called ‘scientific’ racism of the 18th and 19th centuries, and would have little actual 
bearing on the actual social organization of the peoples thus described.  Much of the later 
archaeological work in the region has been in part based on the reconstructions of society gained from 
the understanding of these ethnographic works and others like them. While there cannot be assumed to 
be a perfect overlap in structure and behavior between the societies described ethnographically and 
their ancestors described archaeologically, there are enough similarities that basic comparisons can be 
made, especially in the case of the Gulf of Georgia phase, the period immediately preceding contact.  
Due to the importance of the Salish Sea and its associated waters to the lifeways of the inhabitants of 
the region, it should come as no surprise that the peoples of the Salish Sea region were capable of 
prosecuting conflicts with groups across the region using the power projection capabilities offered by 
war canoes and other boats, allowing them to participate in conflicts far outside their own home waters. 
The canoes that the inhabitants of the Salish Sea region used were smaller and more compact than the 
larger canoes that groups such as the Haida used to travel to the Salish Sea region. This gave them the 
ability to maneuver more freely in confined strait and bays, and opened up the possibility of 
outmaneuvering and ambushing attackers from outside the Salish Sea region, as demonstrated by the 
Coast Salish accounts of the battle at Maple Bay (Angelbeck and Mclay 2011; Elmendorf 1993; Lugrin 
1932).While there are ethnographic accounts that relay stories of fending off attacks from groups 
located in Northern British Columbia and on Haida Gwaii (Angelbeck and Mclay 2011; Elmendorf 1993; 
Lugrin 1932), and of conflicts among themselves (Angelbeck 2009; Costello 1895; Curtis 1907-1930), 
there are no known records of the peoples of the Salish Sea region taking the fight to raiders from 
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outside their region, although Boas (1889) does report a retaliatory attack on a village in northern 
Vancouver Island that had been taken over by the Lekwiltok. 
Ethnographic evidence suggests that the peoples of the Salish Sea region did not use complex military 
hierarchies in their conflicts. There were war leaders, and warriors that followed them. Any further 
organization was apparently ad hoc and was usually only found in situations of cooperation between 
tribes, villages, or other coresidential units (Angelbeck 2009; Angelbeck and Mclay 2011; Costello 1895; 
Elmendorf 1993; Lugrin 1932, Eels 1976, 1985). The war leaders needed to be seen as brave and skilled 
in combat for their warriors to be willing to follow them, as the lack of an overarching, military hierarchy 
meant that those in subordinate positions were not formally bound to follow their leaders, and leaders 
had to maintain their positions through their achievements and force of personality, as shown from oral 
histories of conflicts conducted by the inhabitants of the Salish Sea region (Angelbeck 2009; Costello 
1895; Elmendorf 1993; Lugrin 1932). 
While projectile weapons such as the thrown spear or dart and the bow and arrow were important 
weapons in the precontact Salish Sea region, they were not the only weapons used. Ethnographic and 
archaeological evidence from the rest of the greater Northwest Coast region shows that war clubs were 
used as well, made of both stone and wood. In addition to this, the wealthiest and most powerful 
fighters had access to slat armor made of wood, and also armors made of stone (Jones 2004). These 
weapons and armor were associated with specialists in conflict and were a mark of prestige for their 
users (Fisher 1976). 
In response to threats of conflict from both their neighboring groups and outside aggressors, the 
peoples of the Salish Sea region constructed fortified villages, refuge sites, and lookout sites, which were 
all capable of being used in a coordinated manner by defenders. Lookout sites would be used to ensure 
defenders would receive enough warning of attackers to take shelter or prepare to repel the 
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attackers(Moss and Erlandson 1992; Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998; Angelbeck 2009; Keddie 
2006). The fortifications tended to be constructed as either palisade walls, or as trench embankments. 
refuge sites were constructed with many of the same materials but were often constructed some 
distance from the main site with an emphasis on being unobtrusive (Angelbeck 2009).  The type of 
fortification used would depend on the environment. The inhabitants of the Fraser River canyon used 
their surroundings to create rock fortifications that protected their villages and fishing areas (Carlson 
1997; Schaepe 2006). Whether trench embankments or stockades, the construction of fortifications was 
specialist knowledge. Suttles (1949) reports that the Lummi hired an expert from the Samish Tribe to 
construct a fortification (Angelbeck 2009). This could be an indication that defensive strategies differed 
within the Salish Sea region; if the construction of a fort was routine for the Lummi, they would already 
have the institutional experience necessary for building one. On the other hand, specialists could have 
been lost due to epidemic diseases and other contact-related social upheavals that resulted in large 
reductions in native populations. While earlier locations could have been returned to, the encroaching 
presence of Euro-American colonizers could put previously viable locations out of reach. 
Prospective attackers would also have to consider the local topography of their target. The primary goal 
of predatory raids would have been the seizure of goods and captives (Donald 1997; Ames 2001) and 
transporting these overland for an extended period would have been quite tiring. This would have 
opened the possibility of counterattack by the defenders, something only magnified by travelling over 






   
Alternative Explanations for Evidence of Conflict 
The societies of northern British Columbia and southern Alaska have been the source for studies of 
conflict in the past (Ames and Maschner 1999; Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998; Lambert 2002), 
but the Salish Sea region specifically has been somewhat neglected, usually receiving only cursory 
mention as part of an overview of the PNW region as a whole. Even in studies in which the Salish Sea 
region is included, most of the research, and therefore the majority of evidence of conflict has been 
found in the Gulf Islands and Strait of Georgia regions of British Columbia. Conflict in the Puget Sound 
region is barely touched on at all, effectively it is the neglected subregion of a neglected region. Where 
conflict has been studied in the Salish Sea region, it is usually only mentioned in passing. This 
examination of warfare in the Salish Sea must reject the notion that warfare and the material goods 
associated with it were wholly or primarily ceremonial (Angelbeck 2009). The oral record is full of 
instances of groups in the Salish Sea region taking both offensive and defensive action, in addition to 
engaging in ceremonial conflict. Angelbeck believes that this blindness to the potential defensive utility 
of features in the Salish Sea region may have led to the current lack of archaeological information about 
defensive features, Angelbeck cites Fisher (1976) as an example of this, where firearms were interpreted 
as being acquired in the Salish Sea region for emotional reasons, serving as phallic symbols. Firearms 
would not have been easy to acquire in the mid-19th century, and while there may have been some 
desire to show prosperity through purchasing firearms, it would be difficult to justify acquiring them if 
they did not also serve some other purpose (Angelbeck 2009). Angelbeck cites Buxton (1969) as an 
example of the attitudes taken towards potential defensive features. Buxton interpreted site features 
that could be defensive structures as fish drying areas instead, despite the fact that they are well away 
from any body of water (Angelbeck 2009). Perhaps fitting with the earlier interpretation of the native 
inhabitants of the Salish Sea region as ‘peaceful”, these researchers seem almost unwilling to show 
things as being primarily used in violence even when it would be the simplest explanation. In addition, 
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the presence of lookout sites and trench embankments (Moss and Erlandson 1992; Angelbeck 2009) 
makes it unlikely that war was merely ceremonial.  
Modes of Power and Intergroup Conflict 
The study of intergroup conflict plays into other studies regarding the exercise of individual and societal 
power, and how different individuals negotiate their structures in order to gain power and security for 
themselves and their groups. This power could be physical power, such as gaining access to important 
resources through victory in intergroup conflict, and/or societal power gained through the prestige of a 
leadership position in a successful conflict (Angelbeck 2009; Ferguson 1983).  Wolf (1990) delineates 
four specific modes of power than can be applied to the relations of individuals, groups, and whole 
societies. Individual power refers to the concept of power as an attribute of a person. Interpersonal 
power is the influence that individuals can exert over each other, Organizational power is the ability to 
influence and control others in a social setting, and structural power is the ability to create and destroy 
structures, dictating the societies that other individuals would be exercising their power in (Wolf 1990). 
It is important to note that structural power of this sort is not tied to any one society or system, and 
instead refers to the environment in which those societies develop. Each of these modes of power 
builds upon the other, where they can all become components of the whole of the individual’s 
interaction with power in their culture and society (Wolf 1990). Angelbeck (2009), uses Wolf’s modes of 
power, integrated with practice theory, and examines the intergroup conflicts of the peoples of the 
Salish Sea region through the lens of interpreting the society as an anarchic one, where power was not 
exercised on structured statelike lines, but instead through the interactions of influential groups and 
individuals. Conflicts could be both escalated and deescalated by combatant individuals and polities, and 
both larger ‘wars’ and smaller ‘raids’ could be part of the expression of overarching long-term 
intergroup conflicts. This escalation and de-escalation would take the form of conflict moving through 
different modes of power. Descriptions of historic intergroup conflict in the Salish Sea region include 
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examples of combatants exercising each mode of power to benefit themselves and their groups.  An 
individual could rally support in their community to solve a personal grudge, or remain invested in a 
conflict that the rest of their society had moved on from. 
In the context of intergroup conflict, individual power could be expressed by demonstrating skill at 
fighting, or proficiency in other skills, as well as gaining possession of weapons. An individual’s use of the 
bow and arrow to distinguish themselves in individual hunting could be a means of demonstrating skill 
in gathering food, while also implicitly showing that the hunter would be effective in using their skills in 
times of intergroup conflict (Angelbeck and Cameron 2014). By doing this, a hunter would demonstrate 
themselves to be a reliable member of the community in times of peace and times of conflict.  
Interpersonal power would apply when combatants were showing leadership in small group conflict by 
managing and leading other combatants (Angelbeck 2009). This would be relatively informal, based on 
the relationships between individuals on a personal level rather than any broader structure. An 
experienced hunter taking up a mentor position to younger hunters in their community might be seen 
by the other people in the community as a potential leader in a conflict situation. This would be due to 
the hunter exercising modes of both personal power, due to the hunter’s skill with the bow and arrow 
(Angelbeck 2009; Angelbeck and Cameron 2014), and interpersonal power, because of their personal 
relationships with other hunters in the community. Organizational power could be exercised in the 
maintenance of links with other groups, leading larger groups and establishing large scale alliance 
systems. Structural power is the ability to determine the relations between wider groups, setting the 
patterns of raiding and resource-based conflict that those with less power would have had to interact 
with (Angelbeck 2009).  The more individual power one had, the easier it would be to gain interpersonal 
power, and so on up the scale. This is not to say that one level of power was a guarantee of gaining 
another, but it would be much easier, and disadvantage those that did not already have it. Individuals 
and groups could act in ways that exercised and reinforced more than one mode of power at a time, 
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such as a warrior taking up a leadership position in his tribe’s armed conflict against another tribe. A 
successful conclusion of the conflict could increase the status of the warrior among his community and 
increase the standing of the community among its neighbors (Angelbeck 2009). An ethnographic 
example of this phenomenon can be found in the case of Chief Sealth, who Costello (1895) describes as 
having gained much prominence in the Salish Sea region as a result of successful leadership in conflict, 
further capitalizing on his position by using his oratory skill to gain even more prestige and power. 
As another example of the ways that different modes of power were exercised together, high-status 
family groups collaborated with others in their kin group as well as their neighbors and those with 
whom they had marriage ties in the collective maintenance of status through intermarriage, trade, and 
potlatching (Angelbeck 2009, Elmendorf 1971). If a group of households potlatched with each other, not 
only would they recoup some of their own losses from their potlach with what they received from other 
potlaches, but it would also show the other groups in their community whom they invited that they 
were both wealthy and influential. A long-term good relationship could benefit both groups involved 
immensely. However, the existence of such relationships between powerful individuals and groups 
could make it difficult for newcomers, either families or individuals, to break into these same levels of 
wealth and influence.  Just as the bow and arrow would have been used in more than one capacity, the 
social networks built around ceremonial and kin ties in the Salish Sea region could have also been used 
for the purpose of defense. Ceremonial and kin ties that were developed and maintained by prominent 
groups could have been drawn upon for mutual defense (Borck et al. 2015), and to maintain the 
prominence of the groups.  Status was a resource all its own. In the anarchic society of the Salish Sea, 




   
Resources and Status: Differing Interpretations of the Causes of Intergroup Conflict 
In the late 20th century, the time in which most of the relevant literature on conflict in the Northwest 
was written, the two main theoretical frameworks used in the archaeological study of conflict in the 
Salish Sea region were a resource-based framework and a status-based framework (Ferguson 1983, 
1984; Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998). The resource-based framework, as championed by 
Ferguson (1983, 1984), took the position that conflict in the broader Pacific Northwest region was driven 
by the need to accumulate resources, such as food or land. While this no doubt played a role in many 
conflicts, Ferguson stated that it was the only reason that war was conducted, as he believed that 
people would be unwilling to fight and die if they did not directly benefit from their efforts in the conflict 
(Ferguson 1984). Fitting with this model, Ferguson believed that conflict in the prehistoric Northwest 
Coast region was heavily linked to the distribution of important resources. Food sources, such as 
valuable salmon runs, were one such resource, as were slaves and access to trade routes (Donald 1997; 
Ames 2001; Ferguson 1984). Another resource was access to more sheltered locations that would not be 
devastated by the storms and tsunamis that rolled in from the Pacific. Weapons themselves could be a 
resource as well. While the acquisition of firearms during the early years of the fur trade had 
implications for their owner’s expression of status, their combat utility was also a factor in their 
desirability.  Early Euroamerican observers noted that the vast majority of money gained from the fur 
trade was spent on the acquisition of new weapons (Ferguson 1983,1984). This view of war and conflict 
being driven by resources has been echoed with scholarship examining the oral histories of the 
Tsimshian people through the lens of military history, where it was found that many of their conflicts 
had resources as a base motivation, although most also had other cultural motivators (Buddenhagen 
2011a).  
Ferguson also makes that case that the prospect of war as a deterrent was key for resource distribution 
(Ferguson 1983). If one village or group was perceived as holding too much power, the other villages 
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might band together to raid it. Therefore, to avoid the potential loss of resources, and the taking of 
villagers as slaves, the households of the prosperous village would hold potlaches with both their 
neighbors and relations from across the region, thereby both taking the target off their backs and 
reinforcing ties with their surrounding communities. This was combined with intermarriage to build 
relationships with both near and far communities. The expectation was, however, that the village who 
hosted a potlach would also be invited to other potlaches, where they would be rewarded handsomely, 
thus starting the cycle anew. This cycle feeds into the other cycles and systems governing societies and 
environments in the Northwest. In the resource model, understanding this interlocking set of systems is 
key to gaining a better understanding of war and cultural change. 
Ferguson’s overemphasis of the direct conflict value of weapons disregards both the multiple functions 
of most types of weapons in use in the Salish Sea region, and the broader social context associated with 
their use. Rifles that can kill people can just as easily be used for hunting, and one group’s acquisition of 
them may lead to an arms race, with tribes buying weapons simply to defend themselves against tribes 
with more weapons. In addition, many of these articles of war, such as iron blades and the slat armor 
found in Alaska, were as much status symbols as they were weapons. In that sense, maintaining social 
bonds was just as important as material gain when conflict and seeking arms were concerned.   
Conversely, Maschner and Reedy-Maschner believed that humans have an inbuilt tendency to seek 
status and are willing to resort to violence in order to achieve it. They singled out males as being status 
prone, citing the behavior of primates (Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998) and state that the more 
young men without existing sources for status a society has, the more likely that it is to be violent, as 
there will be more men competing with one another for status who do not have access to the traditional 
structures used non-violently to gain status, such as kin ties or ceremonial relationships. Using similar 
criteria to those that would later be used by Lambert (2002), Maschner examined the lines of 
archaeological evidence for warfare as they occur in the Northwest Coast region through time. The most 
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noteworthy change that he observed was between 1000 and 1500 CE. During this time, there was a 
large shift in the organization of society, with smaller settlements and groups coalescing into larger 
polities (Maschner 1991, 1997). Maschner thought that the condensation of groups into larger 
settlements was a cause for violence, as in his framework it would result in a surplus of young males 
who would seek status. Success in conflict would be one of the most effective ways of seeking status 
(Angelbeck 2009), as successful groups would remember those who helped. 
One of the most recent predominant interpretations of intergroup conflict frames conflict as another 
means of establishing and reinforcing social ties among combatant groups.  This examination of the 
effects of conflict is relevant to the study of conflict in the Northwest because it incorporates the study 
of those affected without being active combatants. It is also useful in integrating the study of armed 
conflict with the study of how individuals interact with other systems of power, and the role of status in 
intergroup conflict (Angelbeck 2009; Angelbeck and Cameron 2014; Grund 2017).  
Theoretical examinations of intergroup conflict must consider the scales of conflict when they measure 
the impact on a society. Along the Northwest Coast, the most common type of group that would have 
conducted conflict would be the village or settlement group, and oral records show that conflict was 
conducted extensively at this level (Lambert 2002). The peoples of the Salish Sea region lived in an 
anarchic system, where those who were not slaves or otherwise bonded followed their leaders only due 
to the prestige and charisma of those leaders (Angelbeck 2016), rather than because of any state or 
statelike structure. Material wealth, often shown by the ownership of slaves (Donald 1997), possession 
of certain coppers or the regular holding of potlaches, was one such means of showing prestige (Suttles 
1987), and victorious performance in both interpersonal violence and intergroup conflict was another 
(Angelbeck 2016; Buddenhagen 2011a). The collective defenses of the Salish Sea region were based on 
collaborations between prominent households and could be broken if there was a falling out among 
these households (Angelbeck 2016).   
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One way to integrate these resource and status-based frameworks for the origins of intergroup conflict 
is to recognize that status itself could be a resource. Prominent lineages had more access to certain 
material resources and would be more likely to have the means to hold potlaches and other ceremonies 
with other high-status groups and individuals.  Among the Tsimshian of the North and Central coast of 
British Columbia, a prominent person’s deeds and the resulting prestige would continue to be 
associated with their family line after the individual’s death (Buddenhagen 2011a). In the more anarchic 
social organization of the Salish Sea region, the status of individuals as expressed through their 
influence, their household, and kin-networks could be leveraged to provide an outsized impact. 
According to Clausewitz, “War is a continuation of policy by other means” (Clausewitz 1832 1.24), and 
this definition would no doubt have applied to the ancestral Coast Salish as well. If ambitious individuals 
could not get influence and prestige through peaceful means or were not born into a kin-group that 
would aid in their acquisition of status, intergroup conflict would provide a vector for social 
advancement. While access to resources might have been a cause for intergroup conflict, if a given 
warrior or war party leader was known to be the one who had gained access to a valuable resource for 
the tribe, the war party leader might gain a great deal of prestige and renown within that community. 
Intermarriage was a means for resources to be shared across kin lines (Angelbeck 2009). However, these 
marriage ties were only accessible to those from a suitably prestigious family group, and would be much 
less accessible to someone from outside these groups. By resorting to warfare, ambitious warriors could 
bypass these traditional means of gaining power and prestige, and gain access to the resources of the 
elite (Angelbeck 2009). Both intangible status and tangible resources could be sought through 
participating in intergroup conflict, so any discussion of intergroup conflict in the Salish Sea region must 
consider both to be valid causes of conflict. 
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Conflict and Social Stratification 
The level of social stratification in a past society without written records and the forms that inequality 
took must be traced indirectly using archaeological proxies. The Northwest Coast region has been an 
area of interest for those studying inequality for decades, as the complex material culture and status 
focused society provided ample opportunities for research, and the Northwest Coast region was 
relatively unique in that it was a highly materially complex society that did not rely on large scale 
agriculture (Ames 1994, 2010). Elsewhere in North America, the introduction of the bow and arrow has 
been linked to increases in inequality and social stratification (Kennet et al. 2013; Bettinger 2013; Grund 
2017; Nichols and Vanpool 2015; Reed and Geib 2013), and this increase of social stratification has also 
been identified in the Northwest (Angelbeck and Cameron 2014).  
Kennet et al. (2013) showed a similar pattern of increase in social stratification when the bow and arrow 
was introduced in coastal California. They hypothesized that these changes were exacerbated by shifts 
in regional climate, and that while the bow and arrow did not immediately trigger an increase in 
warfare, it acted as another destabilizing factor during a period where the cultural and social dynamics 
of the area were already in flux. They also highlight the importance that the bow and arrow may have 
played in the enforcement of intragroup social dynamics. Those who had access to the bow and arrow 
would have been more able to enforce their agendas on others in their groups, and the bow and arrow 
would allow more swift enforcement of custom and preventing what Kennet et al. (2013) term “social 
parasites” from harming resources relied on by the whole of the group. Kennet et al. (2013) also linked 
this change to the bow and arrow with a general increase in signs of violence on skeletal remains in their 
area of study, corroborating information shown by Lambert (1994, 2007). Similar increases of skeletal 
signs of violence have been identified in the Prince Rupert Harbor area of the BC Coast (Cybulski 1978, 
1999). 
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While the resource-focused aspects of warfare have often been stressed in Northwest Coast scholarship 
(Ferguson 1983,1984), it should be remembered that there was also a large social benefit for successful 
raiders, and they would gain power and influence in their communities (Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 
2007). Hunting groups could function as social networks, but if someone was able to kill prey efficiently 
on their own, such as by using a bow and arrow, the influence of the group relative to the individual 
would be lessened. It is also noteworthy that the bow and arrow arguably requires less skill to use than 
the atlatl, and an individual who become proficient in the use of the bow and arrow would have 
potentially more time and energy to devote to other areas of social advancement(Angelbeck and 
Cameron 2014), rather than hunting or gaining proficiency with their chosen weapon. This could have a 
compounding effect, meaning that those who took advantage of the opportunities offered by the use of 
the bow and arrow could have pulled farther and farther ahead of their rivals in the acquisition of 
resources and status (Angelbeck and Cameron 2014). 
Hunting, Fishing, and the Tools of Conflict 
When people of a given cultural background engage in intergroup conflict, the tools they rely on and the 
skills they have developed in other activities will influence the tools and strategies chosen to conduct 
conflict.  Although projectile weapons would have been used in conflicts with other human groups, the 
primary use of the technology would be for the hunting of both terrestrial and marine game, although 
larger marine game would likely have been hunted using spears and harpoons rather than the bow and 
arrow. The significance of certain food resources in a given region would influence the use of tools 
associated with the resource. This would have the further effect of linking the choices of hunting tools 
and the choices of tools related to intergroup conflict. While there would be tools such as armor that 
would be useful in conflict without having a similar utility for hunting (Jones 2004), those would usually 
be owned only by specialists or those of sufficient social status to afford them, while tools with roles in 
both hunting and conflict would be more common. This is reflected by the bow and arrow being an 
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active tool in conflict across North America, while tools such as armor are relatively less common (Jones 
2004). Projectile points are one such type of multiuse tool, and as there is an extensive record of 
projectile points in the Salish Sea region (Croes et al. 2008; Carlson and Magne 2008; Rorabaugh 2015) it 
stands to reason that projectile points and their associated projectiles would have been available for use 
in intergroup conflict.  
Salmon is one of the most important food resources in the Northwest, because of the regular and 
predictable seasonal nature of salmon migrations. Thus, bountiful salmon runs will acquire strategic 
importance. The regular locations of these salmon runs allows for and encourages a more sedentary 
lifestyle than is common in other areas, such as on the Plains or in the Great Basin. This reliable seasonal 
resource would mean that groups would have a set of fixed locations they returned to, something that 
potential attackers would keep in mind while planning offensive efforts against them. While exact 
particulars varied across the Northwest, in general there was a certain degree of collective ownership of 
the salmon runs, with different groups trusting each other to share the run responsibly. Collective 
ownership was built on a network of kin ties and obligations. Failing to meet these obligations could be 
the impetus for both intragroup and intergroup disputes which had the potential to result in either 
violence or the expulsion of the offenders from the group.  
Mass organized salmon fishing was conducted on the village scale and included elements of religious 
and cultural ceremony within its broader purpose as a vital food gathering operation (Suttles 1951). 
Because salmon fishing was a joint effort there was less opportunity for individuals or smaller groups to 
advance themselves over others through their participation in these events, although those who had key 
roles in the salmon harvest might have had other prominent roles in society. Catching salmon might 
have been a more important food source but hunting for terrestrial game offered more of an 
opportunity for advancement of the individual. Barring the personal leadership skills that would be 
helpful in coordinating a group activity, I argue that being an expert or leader in the coordination of 
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salmon fishing would not be something that would set apart an individual from the rest of their 
community when it came to the conducting of intergroup conflict, due to the relatively few overlapping 
skills. 
Salmon fishing in the style of the Coast Salish certainly required expertise and skill, but there would be 
little to no overlap of skills on the individual level between salmon fishing and intergroup conflict, 
barring the level of physical fitness required to fish successfully.  In times of intergroup conflict, 
someone who was skilled at salmon fishing through the weir methods commonly practiced in the Salish 
Sea region would not have any major advantages in experience and skillset over someone who was not, 
assuming roughly the same physical fitness.  This could be a potential point of difference between the 
Coast Salish and groups from the Olympic Peninsula and northern coastal B.C. such as the Makah and 
the Tsimshian, who would have had a lot more individual significance tied into the performance of 
halibut fishers and marine mammal hunters (Suttles 1987, 1989). Those occupations would have been 
conducted on a smaller personal scale with more opportunity for personal distinction (Angelbeck and 
Cameron 2014). While the peoples of the Salish Sea region did not have warrior societies like those 
found in northern groups such as the Tsimshian and the Haida, the experience they had gained from the 
large-scale coordination of activities such as mass salmon fishing would have had applicable uses in the 
course of an intergroup conflict. Marshalling those resources would have been yet another example of 
modes of power being exercised in a context of intergroup conflict. 
Technological and Social Change 
Prior to the introduction of the bow and arrow, the most prevalent ranged weapon used by the 
inhabitants of the Salish Sea region would be the spear or dart, thrown with the aid of an atlatl. One of 
the points that Angelbeck and Cameron (2014) make is that a bow requires less space to effectively use 
than an atlatl and dart (Yu 2006; Whittaker 2010). While the heavier and more forcefully penetrating 
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points used on thrown spears or darts may have been more effective on larger marine and terrestrial 
game, arrow points would have been sufficient to deal with human sized threats. Additionally, it would 
be possible to carry more arrows than darts or spears, and thus combatants armed with bows and 
arrows would have been able to sustain an engagement for longer than those using thrown spears and 
darts. Bows and arrows are thus easier to use in large groups in defensive situations, and in close 
quarters. These two factors Illustrate that the bow and arrow was a more effective weapon against 
other people. In a conflict where one side was armed with bows and arrows and the other was armed 
with spears and darts, the group using bows would have an advantage, assuming there were no other 
mitigating factors. The arrow users would have more individual opportunities to injure or kill their spear-
armed opponents in ranged combat, meaning that they might have dispatched them before the need to 
engage in close combat. 
Whether or not the bow and arrow had a greater accurate range than the atlatl is an area of some 
contention (Hughes 1998). While experimental research conducted by Hutchings and Brüchert (1997) 
appeared to show a higher maximum range for thrown spears and darts due to a higher velocity, this 
was disputed by Whittaker et al. (2017), who demonstrated that Hutchings and Brüchert’s conclusions 
on the maximum velocity of atlatl points relied heavily on statistical outliers that assumed an Olympian-
level athletic ability on the part of their users. Whittaker et al.’s compiled data showed that arrow points 
were capable of much higher velocity due to their smaller mass and size, meaning that they could be 
loosed farther than a dart or spear could be thrown. Experimental archaeology has shown that arrows 
loosed from a bow have a much flatter trajectory than darts or spears thrown using an atlatl (Tomka 
2013), meaning that their flight would have been more predictable, leading to greater potential 
accuracy. Greater precision would have been especially useful in intergroup conflict, as the profiles of 
humans are smaller than those of most large game animals. If both weapon systems were being used at 
roughly the same range, as some ethnographic analysis from Australia, where both technologies were 
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used concurrently has shown (Cundy 1989), those using the bow and arrow would have been able to 
loose more arrows, in a potentially more accurate manner, and from a stationary position, as opposed 
to the running start required for best results with thrown projectiles. 
In a period of protracted intergroup conflict, the transition to the bow and arrow would have had the 
potential to be quite rapid, as any groups that survived an encounter with it would be quick to see the 
advantages. Another aspect of the bow and arrow is that it is much easier for a hunter to hunt alone, as 
extra arrows are easier to carry than extra spears. This could contribute to the stratification of a society 
(Grund 2017) by allowing for individual hunters to gain more prestige and influence by making individual 
hunting more feasible, even if it was usually only practiced against smaller animals such as deer 
(Angelbeck and Cameron 2014). In order to visualize the spread of the bow and arrow, Angelbeck and 
Cameron compiled 49 dated faunal assemblages from sites throughout the Salish Sea region dated from  
8400 to 675 BP. While larger animals such as elk would be more efficiently hunted with a thrown dart, 
smaller animals such as whitetail deer could be taken effectively with the bow and arrow. Angelbeck and 
Cameron believed that assemblages showing an increase over time in the remains of smaller 
artiodactyls such as deer that could be efficiently hunted with the bow and arrow marked the 
introduction of the bow and arrow to an area, as well as the increasing prevalence of individual hunting 
practices that could be undertaken with the bow and arrow (Angelbeck and Cameron 2014). Angelbeck’s 
invocation of Faust in the title of his 2014 paper with Cameron is very telling, as while the organization 
into larger social groups may have been necessary for defense (Borck et al. 2015), it also led to a greater 
stratification of society and the loss of relative status for some of those that relied on the larger group 




   
Escalation and De-escalation of Conflict 
War differs from other conflicts by the scale over time, and the number of combatants. A large-scale war 
might not last as long as a period of protracted raiding, as the potential casualties incurred could have 
devastating consequences for the combatant parties. Angelbeck (2009) reports a case where one of the 
wives of a Snoqualmie chief was kidnapped by the Snohomish, and that chief began preparations to 
attack her captors (Hancock 1860, 1927). However, once the armed party encountered her captors, the 
situation was resolved by him simply paying them a ransom and having his wife returned to him. The 
two chiefs then simply acted as if the disagreement had never happened. While this incident was the 
result of an act of raiding, as part of a wider pattern of raiding, had it been handled poorly it could have 
escalated into a much broader conflict between the two groups.  As Angelbeck (2009) says, these 
conflicts rarely escalate into larger patterns of violence. Conflicts were short, not often escalated 
beyond the initial incident.  If both local groups exhausted themselves in intensive feuding with each 
other, it would potentially leave them far more vulnerable to attack from either a local third party Salish 
group, or from an outside attacker, as demonstrated in the events leading up to the battle at Maple Bay, 
where a village was attacked by the Leikwiltok while the warriors of the village were raiding another 
village in the Salish Sea region (Angelbeck 2009, Elmendorf 1993, Lugrin 1932). The threat of the 
Leikwiltok from the north was matched in later years by the threat posed by the British and U.S. 
Governments in the south and east. Arnett (1999) describes an example of these coordinated alliances 
of Coast Salish people reacting to the British attack on one of the settlements, showing how strategies 
designed to cope with incursions from similarly armed opponents could be adapted in the face of 
bombardment from a British gunboat. In this environment, it would make sense to ward off any 
unnecessary conflict or at least any conflict that was more trouble than it was worth. To return to the 
earlier example of the Snoqualmie and the Snohomish, while the Snoqualmie chief probably would 
rather not have had to pay a ransom, and very likely would have been able to free his wife by force of 
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arms, as his war party much outnumbered the Snohomish. It is almost certain, however, that some 
number of his war party would have been killed or seriously injured in the attempt. The cost of the 
ransom was probably not worth the loss of wealth, production, and respect that would have resulted 
from escalation. In many ways, this is similar to the concept of “Mutually Assured Destruction” which 
entered into strategic thought in the Cold War. Just as two nuclear armed superpowers would both have 
the power to obliterate each other, two groups in the Salish Sea region that invested too many lives and 
resources into a conflict could find themselves irreparably harmed. In the status based and anarchic 
system described by Angelbeck, a leader being responsible, even indirectly, for the deaths of those who 
had chosen to follow them into conflict could lead to that leader losing the favor of the relatives of 
those that died. 
 Another reason for de-escalation would have been that serious injuries or death could have the 
potential to enflame opposition among either tribe, as the relatives of those killed would not be 
particularly willing to let their relative’s killers get away without consequence. This could lead into a 
protracted feud which would negatively impact both tribes and leave them open to outside attack. In 
the case of raiding between different Coast Salish groups, the fact that many villages were linked by kin-
networks would also have played a role in de-escalation, as some in these violent acts would be killing 
their relatives, albeit somewhat distant. Revenge attacks were often targeted at specific households, 
while raids for slaves and loot might target an entire village (Donald 1997; Ames 2001; Angelbeck 2009). 
Individual households could opt out of aiding the others in their community, but this might cause 
troubles down the line (Angelbeck 2009). Oral testimony shows that the tribes of the Salish Sea had a 
very long memory for events (Angelbeck and McLay 2011; Bruseth 1977; Elmendorf 1993; Lugrin 1932; 
Samson 1972) and this oral record was likely even more extensive prior to contact.  
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Projectile Point Analysis 
Analysis of projectile points has been one of the most important aspects of archaeological research for 
decades (Rogers 1940), and the Salish Sea region is no exception to this. Traditionally, archaeologists 
have tied different types of projectile points to distinctive cultural groups or phases. By tracking the 
relative frequency of projectile points in different stratigraphic contexts, they were able to associate 
these phases with artifacts that could be more easily dated (Bettinger and Eerkens 1999). The adoption 
of the bow and arrow elsewhere in North America has been studied extensively (Morrisey 2009; 
Bettinger 2013; Kennet et al. 2013; Grund 2017; Nichols and Vanpool 2015; Reed and Geib 2013), and 
these methods can be applied to the Salish Sea region easily. The projectile point sequences of the 
Puget Sound and wider Salish Sea region have been relatively well-documented (Croes et al. 2008; 
Carlson and Magne 2008; Rorabaugh 2015), and I was able to use this documentation to aid in my 
research. 
Stone arming points for projectile weapons are an important portion of the archaeological record that 
pertains to intergroup conflict, as they are the weapon type that is most likely to survive in the 
archaeological record. Drastic changes in projectile point types that go beyond mere stylistic variation 
could reflect larger changes in how projectile points were used in both hunting and intergroup conflict. 
One potential bias of the study of projectile points pertaining to intergroup conflict is that lithic points, 
usually the primary type of point studied in this manner, are not the only sorts of points used in the 
making of projectiles. In the Pacific Northwest, bone projectiles were very common, as they could be 
used as harpoons which were important for hunting large fish and marine mammals (Erlandson et al. 
2011, Erlandson and Deslauriers 2008, Moss and Losev 2011). However, bone projectiles were fully 
capable of being used against terrestrial targets (Allen et al. 2016) and were often the preferred type of 
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point to use against armored targets due to having the capacity for higher penetration and being less 
likely to fracture on impact (Lowery 1999). Wooden points were also used, and archaeologists have 
conducted tests to determine the relative penetration power of each (Waguespack et al. 2099, Salem 
and Churchill 2016). It has been found that while wooden points can penetrate farther, they are not 
nearly as destructive as lithic points, and thus lithic points can be more immediately lethal. Experiments 
have also been done on animal targets, to see how arrow and dart points might perform differently 
(Odell and Cowan 1986). Combatants could use different types of arrow with their bows, and the spread 
of stone points appropriate for the bow shows that bow technology would have been available for 
defense. While bone points such as harpoons might have been used in different ways than stone points, 
skills gained from using stone points could be carried over to the use of bone and wooden points, and 
vice versa. While bone and wooden arrow points may have had more of a presence in armed conflict 
than lithic points (Lowery 1999), the spread of lithic arrow points, as a proxy for the spread of bow and 
arrow technology as a whole can still be used as a measurement for how projectile points could be used 
in armed conflict. 
In order to draw any conclusions based on the nature of projectile points, it is first necessary to 
determine whether a projectile point was mounted to an arrow or a thrown spear or dart (Thomas 
1978, 1981; Rorabaugh and Fulkerson 2015). One of the most common ways that this is done is by 
comparing points to ethnographic museum specimens (Thomas 1978), but one of the other ways that 
this is done is by comparing the fracture patterns of the artifacts, which can also determine if a given 
point was used for an arrow, or for a dart thrown with a spear-thrower (Iovita et al. 2016). However, this 
method has been critiqued as lacking specificity in the criteria used to separate the two types of points 
(Hutchings 2016), in addition to the fact that fractures at specific locations could just as easily have been 
caused by other damage to the point, such as being dropped or being used as a thrusting point. Another 
method for Identifying darts versus arrows is to compare the weight and dimensions of each point, with 
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points being assigned as either probable arrow or probable dart depending on how they compared to 
set thresholds established by point typologies modeled after museum specimens (Thomas 1978, 1981; 
Ames et al. 2010; Okumura and Araujo 2015; Erlandson et al. 2014).  
The difference between darts and arrows has particular importance in archaeology, as it aids in 
determining when exactly the introduction of the bow and arrow took place (Blitz 1988, Maschner and 
Mason 2013). Studies have been conducted across North America, with the result that a common 
standard of arrow/dart identification has emerged (Ames et al. 2010, Erlandson et al. 2014, Roth et al. 
2011). Hildebrandt and King (2012)’s examination was geared towards the analysis of stemmed points, 
and it is this analysis that forms the basis of Rorabaugh’s analysis of points compiled from sites 
throughout the Salish Sea region (Rorabaugh 2015), and he further expands on this by developing a DFA 
that would allow him to measure stemmed points in the same manner. Rorabaugh and Fulkerson (2015) 
were the first to apply this in the Salish Sea Region, giving a date of 3500 BP as the initial period of 
introduction of the bow and arrow, and 2500 BP as the period in which the bow and arrow fully eclipsed 
the thrown projectile in the Salish Sea region. They argue for a period of roughly 1000 years in which the 
two point types were used in roughly equal proportion, with arrow points steadily growing more 
common without completely dominating assemblages.  
Analysis of Fortifications and Intergroup Cooperation 
Fortification networks would be an important resource for groups engaged in protracted intergroup 
conflict, as they would aid in the defense of important areas and resources. However, fortifications and 
other such defenses would not be easy or simple to build and could potentially require the coordination 
of multiple communities in order to properly implement them, depending on their size and complexity. 
Analyzing the relationships of fortifications to multiple associated communities could provide an insight 
into how protracted intergroup conflict impacted the dynamics between those groups. The Fraser River 
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Canyon has an oral record of conflict, and a series of fortifications have been found in the area, which 
are believed to be interconnected (Schape 2006). Oral tradition collected from the Fraser River area 
speaks of warriors and war leaders, although it is unclear exactly how much of this can be applied to 
other geographic areas of the Salish Sea.  Access to the watershed and the salmon fisheries was limited 
by control of the lower Fraser River Canyon. The Canyon is noted by Schaepe as being at a unique 
confluence of reliable resources, making it a possible target for competition; something worth killing 
over, and thus something worth protecting. In addition, the Canyon is very narrow, with steep hills and 
rapid flowing water, meaning that there are defensible locations suitable for fortification.  This example 
of fortification would be a rejection of the assumption that intergroup conflict carried out in the Salish 
Sea and greater Northwest Coast area was solely predatory raiding, and that protracted conflict over 
reliable long-term access to resources was also a factor in the calculus of war.  
Schaepe argues that some of the Fraser River fortified sites he identified were used as a network of 
lookouts to warn for incoming raids, suggesting cooperation among multiple Stó:lō villages. If one family 
group was injured, the ramifications would spill over and impact the collective security of the rest. 
Schaepe further argues that coordination of a canyon-wide defense system would demonstrate that 
groups were willing to cooperate on defense at a very high level, even with groups that they might feud 
with in other situations. This level of intergroup coordination is beyond that commonly thought to exist 
among groups in the region. 
While the societies of the Northwest Coast were stratified, they were also decentralized, and Angelbeck 
(2009) argues that an anarchic framework might be the best lens with which to view them. An anarchic 
model suggests that in the absence of a unifying body such as a legislature or over-chief, people would 
have relied on mutual aid to coordinate for larger projects, such as the construction of fortifications and 
other parts of a defensive network. Individual households would collaborate at different levels for 
different tasks, such as the harvest of salmon. However, kinship ties were a way for different groups to 
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connect, and they were often used in the coordination of defenses (Angelbeck 2009). Schaepe (2006) 
showed a network of rock fortifications, which could have been used in a coordinated manner by the 
inhabitants of the Fraser River Canyon to spot and defend against attackers. Under Angelbeck’s model,  
individual households and villages could opt out of aiding the others in their  broader community, but 
this might cause troubles down the line (Angelbeck 2009). If the individual households did not provide 
aid when requested, they might be less likely to receive aid from their neighbors in return.  
In terms of archaeological evidence, Angelbeck notes evidence for defense on more than one scale. 
Sometimes individual longhouses would be fortified, and sometimes smaller groups within larger 
settlements would be fortified.  Together this demonstrates another expression of the different modes 
of power as described by Wolf (1990) and Angelbeck (2009), where those with more individual and 
societal power were able to use it to tangibly protect themselves. The process of fortifying a location 
could function as an expression and reinforcement of social bonds and structures (Angelbeck 2009). 
Commanding the labor and capital necessary for the construction of significant defensive landscape 
modification would have been a means of demonstrating the power of those who had commissioned or 
mandated their construction. In addition, those who cooperated in the building of such fortifications 
had the potential to reinforce social bonds with each other.  Angelbeck asserts that when fortifications 
were linked by lines of sight and access, that this was a sign of coordinated action by different groups. 
Given that fortifications like those described could hardly have been constructed without the knowledge 
of neighboring groups, there had to have been at least some acceptance of the idea of fortification in 
the area, even if this did not extend to active cooperation. 
Fortification and Defensibility 
The fortification of strategically important areas shows that there is a willingness to fight in order to 
defend a given location, as opposed to fleeing the area. Of the lines of archaeological evidence for 
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intergroup conflict mentioned by Lambert (2002), fortification is one of the easier to locate in the 
archaeological record. In areas where skeletons or weapons do not preserve or there is a lack of 
iconography related to conflict, fortifications can often be the most readily apparent evidence found of 
conflict. Fortification is one of the most detectable lines of archaeological evidence for conflict, it is an 
important vector for archaeological study in the Pacific Northwest, where some of the other types of 
evidence can be lacking, due to the local environment not being conducive to their recovery or their 
absence from the cultures in question. There are strong ethnographic records of fortification throughout 
the historical period (Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998; Moss and Erlandson 1992; Angelbeck 2009).  
Martindale and Supernant (2009) conducted one of the first research projects to quantitatively analyze 
the defensibility of archaeological sites.  They devised a set of parameters to apply to all archaeological 
sites: size, visibility, elevation and sight lines. A set of archaeological sites in the Pacific Northwest 
region, chosen to provide a broad spectrum of site types, were assessed using these metrics, and the 
results showed the relative ‘defensibility’ of these sites. All of these metrics measure qualities that the 
builders of a fortified site would have had to consider when planning the location of their fortification. 
The approach taken by Martindale and Supernant has been applied to Napoleonic era fortifications in 
Portugal (Gonçalves et al. 2016). Sakaguchi Et. al (2010) used similar criteria to rank sites in the Fraser 
River canyon, an area where Schape (2006) identified a complex network of defenses that were linked 
together by line of sight. Sakaguchi et al. (2010) also incorporated foliage coverage into their model, 
with clear cut land having different values than old growth forest, for example. GIS was used to plot 
paths of travel, and to simulate viewsheds, which demonstrate what those using the site would have 
been able to observe. Referencing Martindale and Supernant (2009), a similar model was applied by 
McCool (2017) to fortified sites in Peru. In that case, extra emphasis was placed on the steepness of the 
slopes leading to the hillforts, to show how accessibility would be limited by the unique variation of the 
local geography. This shows how Martindale and Supernant’s method can be applied outside of the area 
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in which it was first devised. Bocinsky (2014) presented an adaptation of Martindale and Supernant’s 
model for the Salish Sea area, making it viable for multidirectional application in a GIS raster format. 
The networks of lookouts and fortifications constructed in the Salish Sea region would have had to have 
been flexible, able to respond to both local and remote threats. Ethnographic data collected by Carlson 
(2001), as relayed in Angelbeck (2009), indicates that these fortifications would have been used roughly 
equally to defend against raiders from far away, such as the Leikwiltok, and the closer neighbors of the 
tribe. The techniques used to confront these threats might vary depending on the source of the attack, 
but the strategies that were developed could be effectively based in part on the use of these defensive 
landscape modifications. This could reflect two different ‘types’ of conflict that were conducted, and 
potentially two different sets of motivations for conflict. The first is the defense against raiders from an 
outside source. The motivation in this case is straightforward, preventing the loss of property or the 
taking of group members as slaves by raiders. The second application of conflict is expressed in warfare 
or intergroup violence as an extension of other intergroup relations with their local neighbors. However, 
it is important to keep in mind that there was no hard and fast division between these models of 
conflict. For example, neighbors could engage in raiding behavior, as demonstrated in Angelbeck’s 
anecdote of the kidnapped wife of the chief ((Hancock 1860, 1927), in Angelbeck 2009). 
While the analysis of defensibility and the analysis of projectile points on their own are both worthwhile 
fields of inquiry, combining them will lead to a more thorough examination of the state of warfare in the 
Salish Sea region. The more factors that are considered in archaeological analysis, the more complete 
the picture of the environment in which the inhabitants of the Salish Sea region made decisions related 
to conflict and defense, on the individual, household, and village levels. Decisions related to defense 
would have taken both the tools available to the defenders and their local geographical circumstances 
into account, and formulated solutions that addressed them. 
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Chapter Three: Analysis of Site Defensibility  
In order to determine if the widespread adoption of the bow and arrow coincided with changes in site 
defensibility in the Salish Sea region, each of these variables need to be measured independently, so 
that correlation analysis can be conducted.  
I started my measurements of site defensibility using the methods relayed by Martindale and Supernant 
(2009), taking hand measurements of the size, visibility, accessibility, and relative elevation of the 
selected sites, although I substituted GIS Hillshade (ArcGiS World Hillshade 2018) for topographical 
maps, in order to synthesize a value for defensibility. However, I encountered difficulties in replicating 
Martindale and Supernant (2009)’s methods due both to ambiguities in their description, and due to 
errors of calculation and interpretation that come from hand-measuring sites. Therefore, I switched to 
using the raster-based calculations of defensibility laid out in Bocinsky (2014). Bocinsky had noted many 
of the same problems in replicating Martindale and Supernant’s methods, and the raster method not 
only eliminated a potential source of error, it allowed me to calculate the defensibility of all of the sites 
in my area of study simultaneously though the execution of a single program. 
Predictive Models of Site Location 
Predictive models for analyzing site layouts and locations can be applied in order to learn more about 
the nature of intergroup conflict in the Salish Sea region. Two examples of the use of predictive models, 
one applied to site location and the other to defensibility can be found in Maschner and Stein (1995) 
and Martindale and Supernant (2009). Both papers use GIS to analyze sites and determine what sorts of 
location are favored for fortification, or for settlement under certain environmental conditions. 
Maschner and Stein (1995) focused on all aspects of settlement in a small area in southern Alaska. They 
selected a wide variety of parameters to use for the model, such as island size, quality slope and 
exposure of the beach, and distance to sources of fresh water.  These were compared to other sites 
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already found in the area and the parameters were weighted according to how existing sites were 
constructed and placed. They were able to make generalizations from this, such as that the natives of 
the area preferred to build their villages on a south-facing beach as opposed to a north-facing one, to 
avoid cold winter winds. Martindale and Supernant (2009) focused specifically on conflict, and what 
made a given site defensible, and how common such defensible sites were, measuring many different 
site types as a proof of concept. They measured variables focused on aspects of defensibility, such as 
visibility, accessibility, and elevation. These factors would be valuable even in a site that did not need to 
be defended, but they would be weighted differently.  
While the aforementioned models can lead to interesting and useful comparisons, they should not be 
applied uncritically. The unique circumstances and lifeways of the groups being studied must be 
considered when applying a program or procedure in a geographic environment that drastically differs 
from the environment it was first developed in. An example of this is a model developed for the study of 
a high and arid area being applied to an area with regular seasonal flooding. Maschner and Stein (1995) 
tailored their model for their area of study,  and future uses of the same methods must account for 
potential irregularities caused by variations in the geographic region in which they are used. In 
particular, Maschner and Stein (1995) noted that the model they used might not be appropriate for use 
in areas with extensive fjords, as those produce errors and show up oddly in the model.  
In regions where different village groups would have had relatively high levels of contact with one 
another, it can be acceptable to examine different subgroups of sites as one overarching set. This is 
appropriate in the Salish Sea region, as the abundance of waterways meant that long distance contact, 




   
Martindale and Supernant (2009)’s Analysis of Site Defensibility 
In their pioneering study of site defensibility, Martindale and Supernant (2009) identified four variables 
contributing to the overall defensibility of a site and devised proxy measures for those variables that 
could be applied to maps, and also suggested how to weight and combine these four measures for an 
overall estimate of site defensibility. These factors are site size, elevation above sea-level, the sightlines 
of the site, and, the accessibility of the site. While initially I planned to follow Martindale and 
Supernant’s methods, I ended up switching to Bocinsky’s raster-based measurement of defensibility. 
However, the variables and calculations that Martindale and Supernant identified and utilized in their 
research informed much of my own research process, so I will provide a brief explanation of their 
processes and factors. The reasoning behind their choice of variables and their means of measuring 
them is sound, but some aspects were poorly explained or were difficult to replicate.  
 Factor 1: Site Area in Square Meters. While a larger site might be harder to defend due to 
having more potential avenues for approach and more places that defenders would have to allocate 
their attention, the assumption with a larger site is that there will also be more people available to 
defend it. Therefore, in Martindale and Supernant (2009)’s defensibility index, defensibility goes up as 
site size increases. Area was added into their index by dividing the area of the site as measured in square 
meters by one million square meters, representing the largest known site in the Pacific Northwest. I 
used the standard regional site forms to estimate site area, as per Martindale and Supernant (2009). 
While site forms are imperfect, they provide a uniform set of standard measurement estimates. 
 Factor 2: Site Approach Slope. The elevation of a site relative to its local environment is a 
limiting factor in how attackers can approach the site, and impacts how much energy must be expended 
prior to arriving at their target. Prominent elevation can also be useful in establishing lines of sight, as 
can be seen by the use of lookout sites throughout the Salish Sea region.  
44 
   
They measured they measured the site approach slope, which was  referred to in their calculation as 
‘elevation’ by taking the approach slope as created by comparing the height of the site and the 
surrounding area.  I followed their method, calculating the approach slope using the highest portion of 
the site and the nearest body of water, such as the ocean or a large river such as the Skagit, as this 
would be the most likely vector of attack. The approach slope is the angle formed between the closest 
body of water and the highest elevation in the site.  Crucially, the calculations for Martindale and 
Supernant’s defensibility index only calls for one approach slope to be calculated, rather than taking into 
account the broader geography of the site. This means that the resulting calculation would have the 
potential to be skewed in favor of one particularly dominant land feature associated with the site, such 
as a cliff or ravine, rather than take into account multiple potential avenues of approach for a site. 
 Factor 3: Arc of Visibility. In a potential conflict situation, the more information available to 
combatants, the better position they are in to make decisions about how they should conduct the 
conflict. Locations that offer long lines of sight over most of their circumference would have allowed 
more forewarning about attackers, enabling the defenders to react quickly and either repel the attack or 
flee to safety. 
Martindale and Supernant calculated “Arc of visibility” using two measures:  
1.) the portion of the site circumference, measured in degrees, for which direct lines of sight from the 
site were greater than 100 Meters 
2.) the portion of the site circumference, also in degrees, by which the site could be approached on foot 
or by water. 
 “Arc of Visibility” is simply the ratio of 1 over 2. 
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Martindale and Supernant assumed that any sightlines over land would have been obstructed due to the 
heavy vegetation of the forests of the Salish Sea region. Therefore, this was effectively measuring the 
proportion of the site’s circumference that fronted the ocean or another large body of water. 
Presumably, this value or proportion would be adjusted when studying the defensibility of another 
region. 
 Factor 4: Modified Site Accessibility. Martindale and Supernant included modified accessibility 
in their index to measure the extent to which a site’s inhabitants modified the environment to obstruct 
the movements of attackers. Accessibility was measured in the same way as visibility, calculating the 
degrees of accessibility of the site as a subset of degrees of approach. In effect, the smaller a fraction of 
the degrees of approach that were still accessible, the higher the defensibility value gained from 
accessibility. Calling the value ‘accessibility’ seems like a misnomer, as it is measuring the inverse of 
accessibility.  Accessibility was the metric for which I had to use the most individual discretion with 
during my measurement of sites, as there was no clear definition given for what level of landscape 
modification would be necessary for travel to be considered restricted using their model.  Measuring the 
accessibility and approachability of a certain site is not just measuring the ability of someone to 
approach the site, regardless of condition, but rather the ability of a raiding party to access that site and 
still attack it in good condition.  An experienced hiker may well be able to scale the hills overlooking a 
site surrounded by bluffs and use them to approach the site, for example, but it is unlikely that a party 
of raiders would be in any condition to mount a serious raid or assault on the site once they arrived 





   
Bocinsky (2014)’s Analysis of Site Defensibility 
Martindale and Supernant’s (2009) model was a good starting point, but it is not without flaws. The 
largest of these shortcomings is that the index only measures the approach slope of a site as it pertains 
to one vector. This potentially skewed the overall value in favor of a single approach slope even if that 
slope was not representative of the majority of the site, especially if the single approach vector passes 
through a lower portion of the site on the way to a high point. In addition, their use of the size of the 
site and the presence or absence of structures designed to inhibit accessibility as two of their factors 
means that the reliability of their measurements could vary depending on how completely a site was 
excavated and documented. In an area such as the Salish Sea where the much of the archaeological 
investigation is reactive investigation in the context of Cultural Resource Management, this would mean 
that there would be very little in the way of the highly documented and broadly excavated sites that 
would be necessary for this method to be an effective or representative sampling. 
Martindale and Supernant (2009) hand measured their sample of sites using topographical maps. Hand 
measurement is better than no measurement, but replicating hand measurement means that 
measurements are opened up to individual error, and when this is compounded it can lead to greater 
problems with the compiled measurements. Due to the well documented records of fortification in the 
Prince Rupert Harbor area, on the Alaska/ BC border, Cookson (2013) was able to more accurately use 
Martindale and Supernant’s methods in conjunction with the rest of his research because more effective 
documentation of sites meant there were fewer areas of ambiguity in the measurement of relative site 
accessibility. 
Because of these shortcomings, I switched to Bocinsky’s (2014) methodology to measure the 
defensibility of site locations. Bocinsky used a raster, a grid of cells with each cell being given a value. He 
used the elevation of the cells of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s ALOS 30m DEM (JAXA 
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AW3D30 2019), and the relationships between those cells and the 24 cells at a Moore radius of 3 around 
them. The relative elevation of a cell was calculated as the mean of the 24 angles created using the 
formula: [(ARCTAN)*(change in elevation/distance)] for each cell. The relative visibility of the cell was 
calculated from the number of cells at a Moore radius of 3 to the focal cell which were visible 
unobstructed to the focal cell, divided by the total number of cells, in this case 24. (see figs 3.1 and 3.2 
below) Once Bocinsky’s method determined the values of relative elevation and relative visibility, these 
values are added together to create the value of defensibility for the individual cell. His defensibility 
index for a site is the maximum combined score given for elevation and relative visibility out of all of the 
grid cells which include portions of the site.  Site boundaries are determined by shapefiles gained from 
the British Columbia’s RAAD database in the case of the sites located in British Columbia, and drawn by 
myself based on the shapefiles from the Washington State WISAARD database in the case of sites 
located in Washington State. 
Bocinsky’s method for measuring defensibility dispensed with two of the factors deemed important by 
Martindale and Supernant (2009), size and accessibility. The rasters created through his calculations 
only contained relative elevation and relative visibility. These are much less reliant on the presence or 
absence of accurate archaeological excavation of a given site and can thus be applied over a much 
broader spectrum of sites with more potential for a uniform standard of accuracy. While the level of 
completion of an archaeological survey would still impact the known boundaries of a given site, the 
measurements created using Bocinsky’s method do not change depending on the presence or absence 
of archaeological sites in the area, meaning that if a partial site is measured, the defensibility of that 
partial site is measured accurately, and would not change if new areas of the site are found. 
Bocinsky measured the elevation of the raster squares as they related to all the 8 squares surrounding 
them as well as the two layers of tiles beyond them. When measuring elevation and visibility, Bocinsky 
used the 24 tiles within a Moore radius of 3 to the focal tile. This roughly approximated the radius of 100 
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meters as used by Martindale and Supernant, to the extent that it could be matched using a 30m Digital 
Elevation Map. The intervening tiles were used to measure the obstruction of sightlines by intervening 
elevation when approaching the 24 cells at a Moore radius of 3 to the focal cell (see Figure 3.1), 
combining the measurements of each of the 24 cells into a single mean. This enabled the raster to 
record a more accurate representation of the site as it was situated in the surrounding area. While the 
size of the site is no longer directly used in Bocinsky’s methods, the larger a site is, the more cells from 
the raster it would take up, and thus the more measurements for defensibility that the maximum 
defensibility of the site can be selected from, meaning that the area of the site still indirectly impacts the 
score of relative defensibility.  
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Figure 3.1. Elevation calculation in Bocinsky’s method, from Bocinsky 2014 Figs. 1 and 2: showing the 
tiles at a Moore radius of three from the focal tile, and the measurement of elevation for a single pair of 
tiles. 
I agree with Bocinsky on not directly using size or accessibility as metrics. While both would be factors 
that would have been considered in the selection of a defensive location and the construction of a 
defensive site in intergroup conflict, the proper use of them relies on the sites being evaluated having 
already been thoroughly archaeologically investigated. While including these metrics may be worthwhile 
when examining well documented sites such as Ozette, this would also mean that the information thus 
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gathered could only be compared with any real academic rigor to other sites that have well documented 
defensive or obstructing structures or have a clear reason why such structures should not be assumed to 
be in place. As there are only a handful of such sites in the Salish Sea region, this would be drastically 
limiting in the areas where this research could produce replicable results. 
Out of all of the sites with point assemblages that were documented by Rorabaugh, only one of them, 
DgRv 1, had any documented fortification, in the form of a trench embankment (Angelbeck 2009). The 
site at Semiahmoo spit is another site where potential defensive landscape modification has been 
noted, but there has been no official documentation of this feature.  
The archaeological record of constructed fortifications and landscape modifications such as ditches in 
the Puget Sound region, or other areas of the Salish Sea region south of the WA-BC border is biased and 
incomplete due to inconsistent study and recording. This may be in part due to the heavy development 
of the shoreline compared to the relatively undeveloped shorelines in British Columbia and Alaska. In 
areas where the shore was not developed post-contact, the shore fortifications of sites would have been 
better preserved, and more likely to be available for archaeological investigation, as shown by 
Angelbeck (2009), providing examples of sites in the Gulf Islands that have not been built over, and 
show a much clearer record of trench embankment. 
Another reason behind the lack of data on fortifications in this area might be the focus on the central 
areas of sites in archaeological research, as opposed to their peripheries. For example, Grabert, 
Cressman, and Wolverton (1978), investigated only a small, centrally located portion of 45WH17, the 
Semiahmoo spit site, rather than the perimeter of the site, which might have had more defensive 
landscape modification. This is a reflection of the fact that most of the archaeological research in the 
U.S. Pacific Northwest is related to Cultural Resources Management in the face of encroaching 
development, compared to the much larger academic infrastructure in place in British Columbia, which 
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allows for more academic projects to be undertaken (Springer and Lepofsky 2019), and in areas that are 
relatively free from post-contact land modification. This means that large portions of sites are rarely 
excavated south of the Canada and U.S. border, which means that larger landscape modifications such 
as fortifications are less likely to be found, and the full size of sites is potentially difficult to determine. In 
addition, many sites that have an ethnographic record of fortifications or other landscape modification 
have been built over, making attempts to locate potential fortifications using LiDAR difficult if not 
impossible. The sites in the Gulf Islands as described by Angelbeck (2009) are in areas with very little 
construction, meaning that there was less chance for features to be built over, and they were visible 
using LiDAR. 
In order to examine the peripheries of a site, the site’s dimensions must already be known, which may 
be difficult to determine in the face of transformational processes such as erosion or sediment 
deposition, as well as land modification prior to the site becoming of archaeological interest. It may also 
be the case that the periphery of sites are areas where less activity was conducted, and where deposits 
were more vulnerable to transformational processes.  
Of all the factors in Martindale and Supernant’s (2009) defensibility index, approach slope is the one 
that could have used the most clarification. While the process of the measurement of angles was 
straightforward, they did not discuss how to measure approach slope for sites that had more than one 
approach vector, such as a site on a hill that sloped at different angles at different parts of its 
circumference. Under their method, the approach slope of the site would only be calculated from one 
point, even if it only applied to a portion of the site. When I was using this method, I chose to measure 
the approach slope from the site to the nearest large body of water connected to the ocean, as this 
would likely be a potential avenue of approach for attackers arriving by boat. At landlocked sites, I took 
the approach slope from the lowest point on the 100m perimeter, as determined through the GIS 
heightmap (ArcGiS World Hillshade 2018). 
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Bocinsky’s shift to a raster system was immensely helpful in eliminating the ambiguities in this part of 
the measurements. His method measures all 24 cells at a Moore radius of 3 from the focal cell, 
representing a roughly 100 degree radius in the case of a 30 meter Digital Elevation Map. This system is 
omnidirectional, and when it combines the measurements of multiple cells it is capable of accounting 
for all the elevation differences involved in a particular site. Therefore, multiple sites can be measured 
consistently, under the same circumstances. If the limits of more than one site are defined in a given 
region, as was the case in my research, then multiple sites can be measured at once, as the relative 




















   
Table 3.1. The Metrics of Defensibility as Measured by Martindale and Supernant (2009) and Bocinsky 
2014 
 
Martindale and Supernant Bocinsky 
Size Area was added into the index by dividing the square meterage of 
the site by one million square meters, representing the largest 
known site in the Pacific Northwest. 
Not directly 
measured, the 
size of the site 
influences the 




Elevation Elevation is measured by taking the approach slope, the angle 
created by comparing the height of the site and the surrounding 







change of the 24 
cells at a Moore 




Visibility The visibility of the site was measured using the degrees of 
visibility meeting or exceeding 100 meters around the site and 
dividing them by the degrees of approach. 
Multidirectional, 
measures the 
number of the 
cells at a Moore 
radius of 3 to the 
focal cell visible 
from the focal 




of all cells being 
measured (24)  
Accessibility Accessibility is measured in the same way as visibility, calculating 
the degrees of accessibility of the site as a subset of those degrees 
of approach. 








Degrees of approach are not part of the final formula, but are 





   
Comparison of Methods; The Case of 45-WH-17 
A potential example of the sorts of landscape modification that could have been used to improve the 
defensibility of a location is provided by the remains of what is potentially a trench embankment site at 
45-WH-17, Semiahmoo spit. The Site of WH-17 consists of a shell midden spreading across the base of 
the spit. The feature that potentially could be trench embankment runs along the northwestern shore of 
the spit, which is the side that is facing the Strait of Georgia, the main waterway attackers would have 
needed to use to approach the site. In 2019, I travelled to WH-17 with Professor Sarah Campbell, in 
order to document the presence of a land feature at the site that Professor Campbell believed to be the 
remains of a trench embankment. My observations with Dr. Campbell showed that there were clear 
remains of a ditch. While Professor Campbell was convicted of the nature of the feature as a trench 
embankment, I am somewhat less convinced due to the built over nature of this portion of the spit.  
Grabert et al. (1978: 174) did document the presence of historical features to the north of the area they 
excavated. It is possible that this feature is a product of historical land use, or otherwise dates from the 
very end of the Gulf of Georgia phase. However, as the ditch has not been dated this could not be 
determined for certain, and a modern trench would also reveal the midden. It is possible that this trench 
could be the remains of a later stockade such as the one described by Suttles (1951),in which case it 
would be an example of a fortification. This feature is also visible from LiDAR images of the site taken 
from the Washington State DNR North Puget Sound 2017 LiDAR (https://lidarportal.dnr.wa.gov/ 2017, 
accessed 2019), showing the feature extending north of the area excavated by Grabert et al. (1978). See 
Figure 3.2, below.  
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Figure 3.2. LiDAR image of the site 45-WH-17, taken from the Washington State Department of Natural 
Resources North Puget Sound 2017 DTM Hillshade( https://lidarportal.dnr.wa.gov/ 2017, accessed 
2019). The limits of the potential trench embankment are denoted by the blue bracket.   
Given that there has been no dating of this feature, it is unknown whether it was present during the 
period the site was occupied. Regardless, it can be used to illustrate measurement of site defensibility 
according to Martindale and Supernant (2009). It is worth noting that Semiahmoo Spit is immediately 
adjoined to the south by a steep slope and bluff. t would not be out of the question that this area would 
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have been an appropriate location for a refuge site or a series of lookout positions, fitting the patterns 
of the ethnographic and archaeological information compiled by Angelbeck (2009). 
As measured using Martindale and Supernant’s (2009) technique, the site has a relatively open sightline, 
except for the large bluff to the south obstructing view from that direction. The site is approachable 
from all directions, including the south, so there is very little in the way of natural defensibility afforded 
by the location of the site. While the inner portion of the spit would not have needed to be defended 
against attack from the broader Salish sea region, it would still have been vulnerable to attackers coming 
from within Drayton harbor. However, the presence of a potential defensive modification in the form of 
a trench embankment would have a major impact on the defensibility of the site, by limiting the 
potential approach of attackers to specific portions of the site, doubly so when attacking from outside 
the harbor. Although it is difficult to determine the full extent of the landscape modification, if we 
assume that it covered a roughly 90 degree arc of the site, it would have the effect of cutting off direct 
access to the site from that direction, even if attackers could still approach the site from that direction 
and circle around on another angle of attack. Once all of the factors have been measured, the values for 
site area, site elevation, site visibility and site accessibility are added together, and the resulting number 
is the value according to Martindale and Supernant’s defensibility index, as shown below (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2. Elements of Site defensibility measurement following Martindale & Supernant (2009), assuming no 


















































0.890 0.24 0.033 0.617 0 360 222 360 0 0 
45WH17 
modified 
1.015 0.24 0.033 0.617 0.125 360 222 270 0 0.25 
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In contrast, Bocinsky’s method measures the elevation and obstruction of the 24 cells at a Moore radius 
of 3 from the focal cells. The elevation and obstruction values are combined for each of the focal tiles, 
measuring each tile’s defensibility relative to their surroundings.  These are displayed as a raster on the 
underlying 30 m sq grid. However, the raster generated using Bocinsky’s (2014) methods, as shown 
below (Figure 3.3), is not a high enough resolution to show any of the land features of the site, except in 
broad generalities.  
  
 
Figure 3.3. The relative defensibility raster covering 45-WH-17 generated by Bocinsky’s (2014) methods. 
The maximum value generated was 66, the average value was 52. Lighter cells are high values, darker 
are low values. 
Therefore, while Bocinsky’s method excels at the measurement of broad geographical areas, which is 
why I found it ideal for the purposes of my research, Martindale and Supernant’s (2009) method could 
potentially be of great utility in areas where there is a more intact record of site features, such as the 
sites listed in Angelbeck (2009) with documented and dated trench embankments and other defensive 
landscape modifications. 
58 
   
Limitations of the Measurement of Defensibility. 
There are aspects of a local landscape not included in a purely quantitative measurement of the 
immediate physical location of the site, but which should still be considered in the analysis of site 
defensibility. These can be both features of the landscape itself and features of other contemporaneous 
sites in the area. The first of these factors would be the presence of other settlements engaged in 
mutual defense against a common threat. If a given settlement was close to another settlement that 
could be relied upon to aid in defense the defensibility of the route to that site would be much less of a 
priority compared to other factors, such as access to food resources. Conversely, if a given site was in an 
isolated area far from any allies, there would be more impetus to prioritize defensibility in all directions. 
The second of these factors would be whether a given location was the only one on an island with a 
usable beach. This could also apply to the site location compared to other marine routes. If a site was 
situated on the only access route between two islands, it would have more reason to secure itself 
through fortification, both to protect against raiding, and to project power over the marine route. The 
third factor is the presence of local geographical features that would restrict easy access to the site that 
were situated outside of the site perimeter. For example, A site could be in an open valley that had only 
one point of easy entrance or exit, but if it was far enough away, the measurement process would 
potentially underrate the defensiveness of the site. However, the use of Bocinsky’s process establishes a 
baseline for the analysis of defensibility that can be supplemented with contextual information for sites 
outside of the norm, while still providing a robust method to broadly analyze large areas. In contrast, a 
project using Martindale and Supernant’s (2009) method would only be at its most effective in the case 
of sites where defensive landscape modification had been documented, or the site had been 
documented to such an extent that the absence of such fortifications could be reasonably supposed. If 
this could not be established, Martindale and Supernant’s method could only be used by disregarding 
one of its four measuring values, negatively effecting the accuracy of the measurements.  
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Chapter Four: Analyzing Darts and Arrows 
In order to determine the validity of my hypothesis that changes in projectile point assemblages 
could be correlated with changes in site defensibility, it was necessary to obtain a set of dated and 
measured assemblages of projectile points. The most effective available sample of points were the 
assemblages used by Rorabaugh for his (2015) dissertation research. The assemblages came from sites 
throughout the Salish Sea region and were from a broad chronological timeframe (See appendix Tables 
1 and 2), which would hopefully aid in showing the broad trends of change over time in the Salish Sea 
region. In addition, some sites had point assemblages dating from different phases. This is particularly 
useful in investigating how the environmental and other factors affected the inhabitant’s choices in 
projectile points over time. Given that this dataset plays such an important role in my own research, it is 
important to provide a thorough analysis of the aspects of the aggregated points that may reflect on my 
own analysis  
 
The Dataset of Projectile Points Used by Rorabaugh (2015) 
The dataset of projectile points used by Rorabaugh (2015) provided a series of sites throughout the 
Salish Sea region with well documented projectile point assemblages. As his work was focused on the 
geographical and chronological spread of lithic craft traditions including projectile points, his dataset 
was a natural fit for the examination of the of the spread of the bow and arrow through the analysis of 
projectile points. Rorabaugh had already measured an assemblage of projectile points, using a method 
derived by Hildebrandt and King (2012) for the stemmed points, and using those results created a 
discriminate function analysis which he applied to the unstemmed points in the dataset. The indices and 
functional categories that this process created made it possible to estimate whether a given point was a 
dart or an arrow. I use the functional categories of arrow and spear/dart point established by 
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Rorabaugh’s Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA) in my analysis of site defensibility and the associated 
projectile point assemblages for this reason. 
The one area that could have used more discussion is the presence of fletched dart points prior to the 
date of the bow and arrow stated by Rorabaugh. Arrow points are especially similar to fletched dart 
points in their construction (Hughes 1998), to the effect that there can be misidentification between the 
two point types.  If the points analyzed by Rorabaugh were taken on their face value as arrow points, it 
would indicate the presence of the bow and arrow in the Salish Sea region prior to 3500ybp. While 
Rorabaugh’s explanation of fletched darts in certainly possible, the fact that this is something that needs 
to be explained at all means that it is a weak point of the classification. Even if the base measurements 
of the index remained the same, comparing the older points with documented fletched dart point might 
be a way that to establish a more effective means of differentiating the two types of small points, such 
as the discovery of an intact arrow or fletched dart from the period in question at a wet site, allowing 
more secure analysis of these point types to be conducted. 
Rorabaugh obtained this set of projectile point data through the examination of projectile points from 
research collections located at Washington State University, Simon Fraser University, the University of 
British Columbia, Western Washington University, the Burke Museum, and Royal British Columbia 
Museum. This represents a catalog of many of the largest sites of the Salish Sea region. Notably, not all 
of the lithics analyzed by Rorabaugh could be functionally categorized, as some lacked the features that 
allowed them to be measured according to his methods, due to their fragmentary nature. In my 
exploration of this dataset, I will only be referring to the points, both stemmed and unstemmed, that 
received a functional category through Rorabaugh’s DFA.  
Rorabaugh analyzed points from 113 components in 49 separate archaeological sites.  Seventeen of 
these components were larger residential site components, and 96 were smaller components associated 
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with specific activities. Rorabaugh aggregated point data from both single-phase and multiphase sites, 
(see Table 3 of the Appendix). While there are points in the assemblage from site components as early 
as 6000 ybp, the majority are from sites of the Locarno Beach, Marpole, and Gulf of Georgia Phases 
(3500 to 500YBP). Rorabaugh tried to include other assemblages, but could not because of time 
constraints. Given similar time constraints, including the COVID-19 pandemic shutdowns, I was unable 
to measure other point assemblages personally.  
From the assemblages he analyzed, Rorabaugh found 2130 points that could be assigned a functional 
category according to his DFA (see Table 1 of the Appendix). The mean number of points per site 
component is 65.9, the median is 4.0. In practice, this means that the aggregated assemblages are a mix 
of a few large components with many projectile points, and many smaller components with fewer 
points.  
Rorabaugh divided the assemblages he examined into five geographic regions, Puget Sound, Northwest 
Washington, The San Juan Islands, the Gulf Islands and the Fraser River Delta. I am retaining these 
regional categories to show areas of potential variation within the subregions of the broader Salish Sea 
region. Due to the nature of the previous archaeological work conducted in the Salish Sea region, there 
are some gaps due to sampling (see Table 4.1). There are few point assemblages from inland river 
valleys, meaning that the data is biased towards coastal areas. Mainland Washington north of Puget 
Sound is another area with fewer numbers of smaller assemblages. The assemblages cover the five main 
cultural periods of the Salish Sea region. Comparatively, there are relatively few points from earlier 
phases, such as the Charles, compared to the Marpole and Gulf of Georgia phases (see Table 4.2). The 
Archaic phase is effectively a nonentity, with only one assemblage of four points. While this may be 
expected given the relative scarcity of earlier sites, a more robust collection of earlier points could have 
aided in establishing the tool-using environment that existed prior to the introduction of the bow and 
arrow. This is especially unfortunate given that Rorabaugh placed the initial introduction of the bow and 
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arrow in the 3500ybp interval, a period that had comparatively few projectile points in the assemblages 
that he analyzed. 
This sampling problem may have come about primarily due to the fact that Rorabaugh used 
museum collections as of 2015 when he was conducting his research. While he tried to be as 
representative as he could be in the points he used, it is perhaps inevitable that some collections may 
have fallen through the proverbial cracks when he was conducting his analysis, such as the many points 
found in the region that cannot be associated directly to a provenanced and dated site component. In 
addition to this, it is important to remember that the stone points being measured are only part of the 
overall point types being used in the region. Points in the Salish Sea region made of bone or wood, 
would have been much less likely to preserve outside of wet sites. The dataset that Rorabaugh compiled 
did not contain any organic points, as his research was focused on the transmission of lithic crafting 
knowledge.  He however notes that bone arrow points are commonly considered to have been 
introduced contemporaneously with ground-stone lithic points, citing documentation of the 
introduction of ground points in the archaeological record, which is contemporaneous with changes in 
point styles believed to mark the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region (Angelbeck 
and Cameron 2014, C. Ames 2009, Pratt 1992, Rorabaugh 2015). However, only some arrow points were 
constructed using the grinding method, and chipped points would remain the majority throughout the 
Salish Sea region. Ground points would remain in the minority regardless of whether arrow points or 
dart points were more common in the phase. As was the case with the introduction of the bow and 





   
Table 4.1. Count of points utilized by Rorabaugh (2015) using his temporal and geographic divisions. 










500 3 79 
 
33 44 159 
1000 63 21 21 11 126 242 
1500 13 55 1 81 276 426 






3000 78 111 2 
 
17 208 






    
11 
4500 1 15 








    
4 
Grand Total 677 412 72 403 566 2130 
Table 4.2. points in the assemblages analyzed by Rorabaugh, organized by cultural phase and 500ybp 
interval. 
Row Labels Archaic Charles Locarno 
Beach 





    
159 159 
1000 
    
242 242 
1500 





































   
16 
6000 4 
    
4 
Grand Total 4 43 341 1341 401 2130 
 
Points could be constructed both by being struck or chipped or by the ground-stone method used in 
many other lithic crafts in the Salish Sea region (see Table 4.3) (Suttles 1990). While the dataset analyzed 
by Rorabaugh includes points constructed from eleven different materials, the three most common by a 
wide margin are cryptocrystalline silicate (CCS), crystalline volcanic rock, (CVR), and metamorphic rock 
(see Table 4.4). Different point materials were used in different construction methods (see Table 4.5). 
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The CCS points were chipped exclusively while CVR points could be ground or chipped, most commonly 
chipped. Metamorphic points were the only ones that were predominantly ground. Given all of this 
variation, and the fact that both chipped and ground points could be considered arrows and darts across 
the period of study, it seems inappropriate to assume that any changes in projectile point 
measurements carry over one-to-one with changes in material type or construction style. 
Table 4.3. Count of points in the assemblages used by Rorabaugh, showing both construction style and 
functional category by his assigned 500ybp intervals. 
500ybp interval  Functional Category 
  
Chipped versus Ground Arrow Dart/Spear Grand Total 
500 76 83 159 
Chipped  68 78 146 
Ground 8 5 13 
1000 123 119 242 
Chipped  92 100 192 
Ground 31 19 50 
1500 148 278 426 
Chipped  136 274 410 
Ground 12 4 16 
2000 179 334 513 
Chipped  148 292 440 
Ground 31 42 73 




Chipped  161 213 374 
Ground 25 25 50 
3000 90 118 208 
Chipped  72 103 175 
Ground 18 15 33 
3500 34 76 110 
Chipped  23 55 78 
Ground 11 21 32 
4000 3 8 11 
Chipped  1 7 8 
Ground 2 1 3 




Ground 1 9 10 
5000 7 9 16 







Grand Total 847 1283 2130 
65 
   
 
 
Table 4.4. Points in the assemblages analyzed by Rorabaugh, organized by material type and 500ybp 
interval.  
 
CCS CVR MR Obsidian Other Total 
500 18 125 13 2 1 159 
1000 14 211 16 
 
1 242 
1500 29 379 11 1 6 426 
2000 78 367 57 4 7 513 
2500 97 307 10 4 7 425 
3000 9 187 9 1 2 208 
3500 18 73 18 
 
1 110 
4000 1 7 3 
  
11 
4500 1 6 9 
  
16 
5000 3 13 





   
4 
Total 268 1679 146 12 25 2130 
 
Table 4.5. Material type and construction method of points analyzed by Rorabaugh (2015) 
Material Type Chipped and 
Ground 












CVR 1 1531 134 1666 
MR 
 





































The Introduction of the Bow and Arrow in Other Regions.  
The Great Basin region is an area where the bow and arrow is believed to be relatively late coming, as 
Bettinger and Eerkens (1999) claim that it was introduced to the region as late as 1350ybp, far after 
even the latest estimate of the bow and arrow being introduced to the Salish Sea region. They used 
measurements of different point features to assign points to typologies and used those typologies to 
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determine if a point was a dart or an arrow point.  This follows work done by Thomas (1978), which is 
the foundation to much of the projectile point literature in the American West, Hildebrandt and king 
(2012) included.  While there are debates about exactly how reliable the point typologies are in the 
Great Basin region, Thomas (2013) defended them, saying that they were especially useful in tracking 
the influence of the climate on human behaviors. Conversely, Smith et al. (2013) stated that the 
typologies used in the Great Basin region, were potentially flawed, due to points considered to be in 
different typological categories having been deposited at the same time. However, this conclusion has 
been disputed (Hockett et al. 2014, Smith et al. 2014). Despite this controversy, the introduction of the 
bow and arrow to the region still seems to be estimated at roughly the timeframe proposed by Bettinger 
and Eerkins (1999).    
The Columbia Plateau region is an area where the bow and arrow is considered to have been introduced 
relatively early. Chatters (2004) documented the ways that the introduction of the bow and arrow 
shaped the formation of village sites across the plateau in a more defensive direction, giving 
approximately 2500bp as the date this began.  Ames et al.(2010) state that many of the current models 
for the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Columbia Plateau region and the western portion of 
North America as a whole are too recent. They argue for 8000ybp as an effective introduction date for 
the bow and arrow, with 4500ybp being the time where it truly began to become more prominent. 
Ames et al.’s push for an earlier introduction date for the bow and arrow shows that even as the 
introduction date for the bow and arrow is up for debate in the Salish Sea region, the same can be said 
for other regions across western North America. 
In contrast to the predominant approach of using an index to categorize points, Erlandson et al. (2014) 
urged caution in the use of indices to classify projectile points, and said that they should not be used 
universally. They provided evidence of points from California’s Channel Islands which are believed to be 
dart points, but are small enough to have the index values of arrow points. The issue of fletched small 
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dart points being potentially mistaken for arrow points or vice versa is an issue that has the potential to 
severely jeopardize the use of any index such as this, unless it is properly accounted for. 
Hildebrandt and King (2012)’s Stemmed Dart-Arrow Index. 
Hildebrandt and King (2012) use points from assemblages in the Great Basin Region, combining research 
conducted in that region’s projectile points from museum collections with documented confirmation of 
dart or arrow usage such as being found dry-preserved with wood intact (Thomas 1978). In trying to 
establish the use category of heavily retouched points, Hildebrandt & King (2012) found that length, 
shoulder angle, and base width were too variable to be useful, whereas neck width and maximum 
thickness were better predictors, based on experimental work conducted by themselves and by 
Flenniken and Raymond (1986), which showed that these attributes were the least vulnerable to the 
stresses of use.  They analyzed points before and after they suffered damage and retouch in order to 
establish this pattern, using points that they constructed in the style of points from their area of study 
and took them through similar patterns of damage and retouching as seen in the archaeological record. 
Their index, consisting of neck width and maximum thickness added together, was used to create a dart 
and arrow index (see Figure 4.1)  
 
Figure 4.1. Neck Width and Maximum Thickness of a Hypothetical Stemmed Projectile point. Taken from 
Figure 1 of Hildebrandt and King (2012). 
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However, Hildebrandt and King’s (2012) measurement can only be used on stemmed points as 
unstemmed points do not have a neck that can be measured. While this is less of a problem in areas 
such as the Great Basin, where many points are stemmed, the Salish Sea region is an area where most 
projectile points are unstemmed, and thus cannot be measured on Hildebrandt and King’s index. 
Rorabaugh used the stemmed dart-arrow index developed by Hildebrandt and King as the basis of his 
own research into the properties of unstemmed projectile points (2015).  
  
Rorabaugh’s (2015) Analysis of Stemmed and Unstemmed Projectile Points in the Salish Sea Region. 
Rorabaugh based his calculations on measurements of stemmed points from 49 sites in the Salish Sea 
region. He used these measurements to create a discriminate function analysis, in order to determine 
what features of unstemmed points would be the best determinant of whether a point was an arrow or 
a dart, in the same way that the neck width and maximum thickness functioned in Hildebrandt and 
King’s (2012) method. 
Rorabaugh did this by using characteristics of the stemmed points which were shared by the 
unstemmed points: maximum thickness, width and length, blade width and length, and haft width and 
length. Through his discriminant function analysis, Rorabaugh found that the most important metrics for 
classifying an unstemmed point as a dart or an arrow armature were maximum thickness, blade width 
and haft width (See Figure 4.2). 
 
69 
   
 
Figure 4.2, example projectile point measurements. Taken from Figure 6.2 of Rorabaugh (2015) 
All of these would logically have an impact on the overall weight and mass of the projectile point and 
would thus influence whether it could be more effectively used on an arrow or a thrown projectile. 
Using discriminant function analysis, Rorabaugh was able to determine the dividing threshold for a new 
set of functional categories, which he labeled Darts/Spearpoints and Arrows containing both stemmed 
and unstemmed points. It is this category system that I will use in my analysis. 
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Limitation and Biases of the Dataset. 
One of the largest limitations of this dataset is that it does not record any of the bone projectile points 
found alongside lithic points, or in other site components in the Salish Sea region, even though such 
points are known archaeologically and ethnographically (Suttles 1987, Angelbeck 2009). This is to be 
expected given that Rorabaugh was investigating a different research question specifically related to 
lithic crafts, and he can hardly be faulted for not tailoring his research process to specifically suit my 
questions.   
Rorabaugh divided the points that he analyzed into five geographic subregions of the broader Salish Sea 
region. Perhaps inevitably, there is some variation in the number of points analyzed from each 
subregion. The Fraser delta was the subregion with the most points to be analyzed, perhaps to be 
expected given the long record of archaeological sites in the region, including those that would give 
their names to the Locarno Beach and Marpole phases. The Gulf islands, San Juan islands, and Puget 
Sound subregions all have relatively similar numbers of points, although somewhat varying in 
chronological distribution. Northwest Washington is the subregion with by far the fewest points, having 
less than a quarter of the points of the next smallest subregion. This is far and away the area that would 
have benefited the most from a larger sample in the dataset assembled by Rorabaugh. The Northwest 
Washington sample is so small that I question the validity of analyzing it on the same level as the other 
subregions in this dataset. Throughout my analysis, I will be including the Northwest Washington site 
components with the Fraser Delta, and analyzing the two island subregions together, due to their 
geographic proximity.  
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Rorabaugh also did not document the presence or absence of any organic points in the assemblages that 
he investigated. While it would have been helpful if Rorabaugh provided a brief overview of the styles of 
bone points that were used alongside the lithic tools of different phases, this is perhaps to be expected 
given they are not directly related to his research questions. I did not conduct an analysis of bone points 
in my research process due to time and scope limitations, and I am sure that the same applied for 
Rorabaugh. At present, there is no similar set of metrics that are used to differentiate organic darts and 
arrows from each other in the similar style of Hildebrandt and King (2012)’s methods, so the users of 
bone points must be assumed to have access to the same methods of delivery, alongside others such as 
harpoon technology, as their contemporaries using lithic points. Presenting bone points alongside lithic 
points without an analogous means of differentiating them would mean that the accuracy of the 
analysis would have been questionable. Consciously limiting to lithic points kept the scope of the project 
manageable, and also avoided the need to determine if sites with only one of the two material types 















   
Chapter Five: Analysis of Results 
 
In order to determine if the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region correlated with 
an increase in the relative defensibility of areas of activity recorded in the archaeological record, I will 
examine the correlation of the metrics of average and maximum relative site defensibility versus two 
different metrics from the projectile point assemblages. The first of these is the average score on the 
unstemmed dart arrow index created by Rorabaugh’s (2015) Discriminate Function Analysis (DFA). The 
second metric is the proportion of arrow points in a given assemblage. 
The first relationship will show the relative influence of arrow points on the toolmaking style of the 
wider era and phase. Using Rorabaugh’s index, points below a certain combined threshold of 
measurements were classified as arrow points, and a low average on the dart and arrow index for an 
assemblage shows that even those who used points that the index would classify as darts would have 
had a familiarity with the construction of points that could be classified as arrows. 
The second will show the prevalence of the specific use of arrow points. When this measurement is 
combined with dart / arrow index score of the point assemblage, it will provide a more complete 
examination of the introduction of the bow and arrow by showing the use of arrow style points and the 
influence of arrow style points on the overall toolmaking styles of the relevant periods. 
 
Synthesis of Data    
 
Mine is the first research in the Salish Sea region to directly examine the association of these variables 
through statistical analysis and how they relate to intergroup conflict. The relationships between these 
four metrics will be used to address two different aspects of the introduction of the bow and arrow as it 
pertains to site defensibility.  
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 Temporal Subdivision and Comparison. I will also compare the relative site defensibility of a 
sample of sites to the composition of point assemblages through three different cultural phases. Sites 
that have more than one component will be counted in their first occupation phase. This will show when 
or if the inhabitants of sites with certain levels of defensibility chose to utilize the bow and arrow in their 
toolmaking and defensive strategies. When I am analyzing point assemblages without considering site 
defensibility, I will analyze the point totals from all phases. I have chosen to use Rorabaugh’s (2015) 
division of site components and point assemblages into 500 year intervals formed by rounding the 
calibrated radiocarbon date of the associated site component to the closest of these intervals. This 
means that the points, assemblages, and components in the 2000bp category, for example, have 
calibrated date averages from 2250 to 1750 bp. The 2500 bp category has assemblages from both the 
Locarno Beach and Marpole phases, and the 1500bp category has points from both the Marpole and 
Gulf of Georgia phases, all other categories are exclusive to a single phase (see Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1. Count of site components by cultural phase and 500 year interval. 
Years BP Archaic Charle
s 















    
22 
2500 
   
1 5 
3000 


















   
6000 1 
    
 
It is also worth noting that the earlier sites tend to have much smaller numbers of points than the later 
sites (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3), meaning that measurements of one point can have disproportionate 
74 
   
impact on the overall index value or proportion of the assemblage, potentially indicating that results 
from earlier periods should be less relied upon in interpretation than those from later periods. 
 
Table 5.2. Count of projectile points in the assemblages analyzed by Rorabaugh (2015) by 500 year 
interval. 












Table 5.3. Count of projectile points in the assemblages analyzed by Rorabaugh by cultural phase.  
Archaic Charles Locarno 
Beach 
Marpole  Gulf of 
Georgia 
Number of Points 4 43 339 1313 398 
 
 Landform and Subregional Comparison. I will also compare the defensibility and point 
assemblages of sites situated on different types of landform: mainland coastal, island, and mainland 
inland (see Table 5.4). By doing this, I will be able to show how different groups with different landforms 
and resources available to them utilized their resources for defense. This may also show how the 










   
Table 5.4. The number of points and site components for each of the local geography types by the 500-
year intervals used by Rorabaugh. Number in parentheses is the number of site components.  






500 124 (5) 3 (1) 
 
29 (1) 
1000 142 (6) 81 (6) 
 
14 (2) 
1500 322 (5) 17 (3) 
 
78 (2) 
2000 172 (10) 58 (7) 91 (1) 183 (4) 
2500 
 
238 (4) 166 (1) 14 (1) 
3000 128 (3) 80 (2) 
  
3500 62 (2) 48 (3) 
  
4000 
   
11 (2) 
4500 15 (2) 1 (1) 
  
5000 
   
16 (1) 
6000 
   
4 (1) 
 
In addition to the above, I will compare the differences in defensibility and point assemblages for the 
different subregions of the Salish Sea region, merging the Gulf and San Juan Islands into the broader 
Islands subregion, and the NW Washington and Fraser Delta subregions into the broader Northern 
Mainland subregion (see Table 5.5). 
 
Table 5.5 The number of points by merged region in 500-year intervals used by Rorabaugh. The Rest of 
the Salish Sea referred to elsewhere combines the Northern Mainland and Island categories. The number 
in parentheses is the number of site components. 




500 120 (4) 3 (1)  33 (2) 
1000 142 (6) 84 (7)  11 (1) 
1500 322 (5) 14 (3) 81 (2) 
2000 172 (10) 236 (10) 96 (2) 
2500 
 
252 (5) 166 (1) 
3000 128 (3) 80 (2) 
 



















   
Generation of Results 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, I used the sample of measured projectile points from 77 different 
assemblages drawn from 44 different sites throughout the Salish Sea region used by Adam Rorabaugh 
for his (2012) research. I also generated a raster for the defensibility of the Salish Sea region, and 
applied shapefiles gained from the British Columbia’s RAAD database in the case of the BC sites 
(https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/industry/natural-resource-use/archaeology/systems/raad), and 
drawn by myself based on the shapefiles from the Washington State WISAARD database 
(https://wisaard.dahp.wa.gov/) (see Figure 5.1).  
 
This raster was created using Bocinsky’s (2014) methods (see below). I took the maximum and average 
values for defensibility calculated from the raster cells within the different shapefiles and correlated 
those against:   
1.) the proportion of points that could be classified as arrows using Rorabaugh’s DFA, and, 
2.) the average value on Rorabaugh’s dart/arrow index, from all of the points of a given site component. 
This data was investigated without placing it chronologically, meaning that while the proportion of 
arrow points may be correlated with site defensibility in a similar manner to expectations (see below), it 
does not directly show whether the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region led to an 
increase in site defensibility. 
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Figure 5.1. The defensibility raster generated for the Salish Sea Region. The lighter the raster tile, the 
more defensible the location.  The colored shapes indicate the rough locations of the site components in 
question. Red shows the Fraser Delta area sites, Yellow shows the Gulf Islands sites, Green shows the San 
Juan Islands sites, Blue shows the Northwest Washington sites, and Purple shows the Puget Sound area 
sites.   
 
 
 Initial Expectations. I had four primary expectations when I began this research. 
1. As per arguments by Angelbeck (2009), Angelbeck and Cameron (2014), and Rorabaugh and 
Fulkerson (2015), site defensibility would increase along with the relative proportion of arrows 
and the average index value of projectile point assemblages. As my research evolved, this 
expectation was refined down to expecting that the defensibility values of the sites would 
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increase along with the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region, as expressed 
by the correlations between the proportion of points considered arrows in Rorabaugh’s DFA and 
the average value of the overall assemblage on the dart/arrow index against the average and 
maximum defensibility of their associated sites as measured using Bocinsky’s (2014) raster 
method. 
2. The average dart/arrow index value would trend down over time, which would show the 
relative influence of arrow style points on the toolmaking style of the wider era and phase. A 
low average on an overall assemblage shows that even those who used points that the index 
would classify as darts would have had a familiarity with the construction of arrow style points. 
3. The average proportion of arrow points would increase over time, showing the increasing use of 
the bow and arrow in the region.  
4. The average and maximum defensibility of the associated sites would also increase over time 
due, presumably, to the introduction of the arrow, but perhaps from other causes as well. 
5. This defensibility increase would occur coincident in time with or after any substantial increase 
in arrow points or decrease in the Dart/Arrow index  
 
 
 Results Compared to Expectations. In contrast to my expectations, I found that there is a slight 
positive correlation between the maximum defensibility of a given site and the proportion of arrow 
points, and a slight negative correlation between the maximum defensibility of a site and the average 
dart/arrow index value of the site (see Table 5.6). The higher the defensibility value of the most 
defensible portion of the site was, the higher the proportion of points that could be considered arrows, 
and the more arrow-like the average index value of the aggregated points. The more defensible the 
most defensible portion of the site was, the smaller the points were using Rorabaugh’s (2015) methods.  
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The arrow proportion and the dart/arrow index were not significantly correlated with the average site 
defensibility values, and the averages were not strong measurements to begin with , so I will not be 
discussing them going forward. 
 







Arrow Proportion  
Max Defensibility 








0.22 0.140 -0.204 -0.157 
T value  1.938 1.217 -1.809 -1.37 
Statistical 
significance 
0.028 0.114 0.037 0.087 
 
As I had initially expected, the correlations show that the average and maximum defensibility of a site 
are correlated positively with the proportion of arrow points, and negatively with the average value of 
points from Rorabaugh’s DFA. In other words, the higher the defensibility, the higher proportion of 
arrow points, and the smaller the points tended to be on the most significant factors used in 
Rorabaugh’s DFA, namely maximum thickness, blade width and haft width. However, the average 
defensibility gave much weaker correlations and less statistically significant results than the maximum 
defensibility.  Maximum site defensibility and proportion of arrow points are the variables that had the 
strongest and most statistically significant correlation to each other, with a positive correlation of 0.22 
and a statistical significance of 0.028. Therefore, I will be basing my further analysis around the 
relationship between these variables. While the other correlations might gain strength and significance 
when examined with a larger dataset, given this sample their relationships are not statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level of significance.  It is understandable that the average index value and the average 
proportion of arrows would have similar strength and significance of correlation to maximum 
defensibility, albeit one being a positive correlation and the other a negative one. The smaller the 
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average index value of an assemblage, the higher the proportion of points that would be classified as 
arrows. 
 The relationship between the average on the dart-arrow index and the maximum site defensibility, is 
much stronger and more statistically significant than the measurements involving the average 
defensibility. However, I have also noted that the average on the index is also very strongly and 
significantly negatively correlated with the proportion of arrows (r= -0.69, T = -8.22, p <.001). Given this, 
it can reasonably be assumed that examinations of the arrow proportion by site and the average value 
on the dart-arrow index would reflect roughly similar changes and trends. Therefore, I will be using 
proportion of arrows as the basis for the rest of my analysis, as it is simpler to measure one value rather 
than two, enabling me to conduct a deeper analysis. While I have attempted to document specific 
variables where relevant, see Table a.1 of the appendix for a full list of all site components and their 
relevant data. While both plots (Figure 5.2 a,b) show the data behaving similarly to how the correlation 
coefficients would suggest, the comparison of proportion of arrows and maximum defensibility shows 
that there are many sites that do not have any arrows at all. As both arrow and dart points have index 
values, the plot for the average index value lacks thoe outliers caused by the components with no arrow 
points, or only arrow points (Figure 5.2 a and b). As obvious outliers have the potential to effect the r 
values, further analysis may also separate out the site components with 10 or more projectile points, in 




   
 
 
Figure 5.2 a and b. scatter plots of the average maximum defensibility compared against both the 
proportion of arrows and the average index value for all site components in the dataset. 
 
 Chronological Comparisons of the Data. When I examine the data chronologically, I use the 
same 500-year intervals that Rorabaugh used throughout his analysis of the points, to enable easier 
comparison of the datasets. 
When the proportion of arrows is plotted against the average maximum defensibility over the 500-year 
intervals used by Rorabaugh, there is no clear single trend of increasing maximum defensibility 
corresponding to the increase in proportion of arrows. Instead, there are increases and decreases 
throughout the period of study, some of which coincide with changes in overall arrow proportion (See 
Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3. average proportion of arrows (orange line), and average maximum defensibility (Blue 
columns),for all site components in the dataset, by 500-year interval.  Error bars are 1 standard deviation 
for both average arrow proportion and average maximum defensibility. 
While the arrow proportion data does show dramatic changes from 6000 to 5000 BP, this is most likely 
due to the relatively small sample size of both points and sites available from those periods (see Table 
5.5) The correlation between average maximum defensibility and average proportion of arrows was still 
significant when the sites from 4500bp and later were tested (r=0.214,T=1.858, p<.05). In order to 
measure the impact that outlier sites with relatively few points could have on the aggregated means of 
the time categories, I filtered out all site components with less than 10 projectile points, and analyzed 
the trends again (See Figure 5.4). When this was done, all but one of the site components that had only 
dart or arrow points had been filtered out, meaning that the disproportionate impact of one-or-two-
point assemblages was negated. Once the sites with ten or more projectile points were analyzed over 
time, the direction of change in the average proportion of arrows and average max defensibility still 
matched each other in 4 out of the 9 transitions between time increments, such as in the 1500ybp-



















































































   
 
Figure 5.4. average proportion of arrows (orange line), and average maximum defensibility (Blue 
columns),for all site components with 10 or more points, by 500-year interval. Error bars are 1 standard 
deviation for both average arrow proportion and average maximum defensibility. 
  Analysis by Cultural Phase. When the relationships between the average proportion of arrows 
and the average maximum defensibility were graphed according to the cultural phase of the site 
component, it initially showed that all phases had a positive association between the proportion of 
arrows and the maximum defensibility. However, many of these sites had a very small number of 
projectile points, and adding them alongside the data from much larger site components with more 
points could potentially skew any correlations. n this section I explore the detailed patterns by cultural 
phase underlying the larger scale patterns noted above.  In Figure 5.5 a-d, I show the raw regression 
relationships, and then the data filtered to remove extreme outliers (assemblages with less than 10 
points) in the arrow proportion measure (Figure 5.6 a-d), and summarized in Table 5.7. As can be seen, 

































































































Figure 5.5 a through d. Linear regressions of average maximum defensibility (x) and the proportion of 
arrows (y), through the four main cultural phases studied. 
 
 



















































Locarno Beach (3500-2500ybp) n=11



















































Gulf of Georgia (1500-500ybp) n=22
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Figure 5.6. a through d. Linear regressions of average maximum defensibility (x) and the proportion of 
arrows (y), through the four main cultural phases studied, showing only site components with 10 or more 
projectile points. 
 





















































Locarno Beach (3500-2500ybp) n=9


























Marpole (2500-1500 ybp) n=16



























Gulf of Georgia (1500-500ybp) n=8
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Table 5.7. The Correlation Between Arrow Proportion and Maximum Defensibility by Cultural Phase, 
measuring Sites with 10 or more points.  
  
R T Value Statistical Significance 
Overall -0.167 0.990 0.164 
Charles 0.270 0.281 0.399 
Locarno Beach -0.278 0.764 0.232 
Marpole 0.141 0.512 0.308 
Gulf of Georgia -0.744 2.729 0.013 
 
The Gulf of Georgia phase is the only phase in which there is a significant relationship between the 
proportion of arrows and the maximum defensibility, and in this case it is a very sharply negative 
correlation. The more defensible a site was, the smaller the proportion of arrow points in the related 
assemblages. As this is the phase that differs from the others, it deserves a closer examination  
 
Comparison of Marpole and Gulf of Georgia 
 
When comparing the maximum defensibilities of the site components with 10 or more projectile points 
from the Marpole and Gulf of Georgia phases, a t-test reveals that they are not significantly different at 
a <.05 level.   (t= 0.5332, n=24, p=0.3)  
 
There is also no significant difference between the arrow proportions of the two phases   (t= -0.799, 
N=24 p=.216). This would seem to indicate that the Gulf of Georgia’s significant relationship between 
arrow proportions and defensibility comes from a different underlying cause than the existence of the 
bow and arrow in the Salish Sea region, as the bow and arrow would already have been used in the 
region for generations.  
 
The difference in behavior that might best account for the changes between the two periods is the 
growth of large multifamily settlements in the beginning of the Gulf of Georgia phase, along with an 
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overall increase in population (Angelbeck 2009, Croes and Hackenberger 1988). If the inhabitants of the 
Salish Sea region were living in larger settlements, they would have had larger groups with which to 
defend themselves. One possible consequence of this change is that the individual choice of weapon 
was less of a factor in the conflict performance of the overall group. Something interesting to note is 
that the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region seems to have occurred 
independently of the adoption of a more materially complex society in the Salish Sea region during the 
Marpole phase (Clark 2013). The bow and arrow had no significant correlation to defensibility during 
this period (See Table 5.7), and there was no single linear trend of proportions of arrows during this 
period (See Figures 5.3, 5.4). That the use of the bow and arrow seems to have been relatively constant 
during a period where so many other cultural elements changed, is certainly worth noting. 
 
The Gulf of Georgia phase had an exceptionally high negative correlation between the site arrow 
proportion and the site maximum defensibility. The R squared value suggested that over 50 percent of 
the decrease in arrow proportion could be accounted for by the increase in maximum defensibility. In 
addition to this, the Gulf of Georgia phase is the only phase in which there is a significant relationship 
between the proportion of arrows at a site, and the average maximum defensibility.  This is a clear 
contrast to the sites from other phases, and could be representing the effects of some as of yet 
unknown phenomena. When comparing the site components with ten or more projectile points against 
the other sites from that period, two things are immediately notable. As there was only one site 
component from the 1500ybp interval that was part of the Gulf of Georgia phase, and this component 
had less than 10 projectile points associated with it (See Table 5.8), the measured components are all 
within the 1000ybp and 500ybp intervals. This means that there are no site components from the 
immediate transition from the Marpole to Gulf of Georgia phase, only from later periods. 
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Table 5.8. The site components from the Gulf of Georgia phase, showing their 500ybp time increment 
and if they had 10 or more projectile points.  
 
500ybp interval Less than Ten Points Ten or More Points 
500 4 3 




 In addition to this, all of the components from the northwest Washington subregion had less than 10 
projectile points, meaning that sites from this region were not measured in this analysis. The majority of 
the site components measured in this period were Island subregion sites (See Table 5.9), located in San 
Juan and Gulf Islands (See Table 5.10), areas where the average arrow proportions in assemblages are 
lower than those in the Puget Sound subregion (See Table 5.11). Perhaps, due in part to a higher 
reliance on marine resources compared to terrestrial hunting, which is one of the main areas where the 
bow and arrow replaced the thrown spear or dart.  
 
Table 5.9. The site components from the Gulf of Georgia phase, showing their local landform type and if 
they had 10 or more projectile points. 
 
Site Landform Type Less than Ten Points Ten or More Points 
Island 7 5 
Mainland Coastal 6 1 
Mainland River 1 2 
 
Table 5.10. The site components from the Gulf of Georgia phase, showing their geographic location by 
subregion and merged region, and if they had 10 or more projectile points. 
Merged Regions and Subregions  Less than Ten Points Ten or More Points 
Islands 6 5 
     Gulf Islands    4    2 
     San Juan Islands    2    3 
Northern Mainland 7 1 
     Fraser Valley    1    1 
     NW Washington    6 
 
Puget Sound 1 2 
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Table 5.11. Average arrow proportion and average maximum defensibility of site components from the 
Gulf of Georgia phase with 10 or more projectile points, divided by subregion. 
Subregion Average of Max Defensibility 
of the site 
Average of Proportion of points 
considered arrows 
Fraser Valley 58 (Single Site) (N=1) 0.508 (Single Site) 
Gulf Islands 51.5 (stdev 0.7) (N=2) 0.608 (stdev 0.27) 
Puget Sound 53 (stdev 0) (N=2) 0.806 (stdev 0.02) 
San Juan Islands 62 (stdev 2.65) (N=3) 0.351 stdev 0.09) 
 
Given the increase in population of the overall Salish Sea region during the Gulf of Georgia Phase (Croes 
and Hackenberger 1988), there would have been extra pressure placed on competition for food 
resources, and thus local reliance on points best suited to food gathering. Conversely, this could also 
reflect a local change to the primary use of bone points for arrows, meaning that the analysis of only 
lithic points would not be able to show the entire spectrum of tool-usage in this period. Further analysis 
of this period would be best done comparing both lithic and bone assemblages at the same time, in 
order to determine if there are gaps in one dataset that can be explained by the other. 
 
Geographic Analysis of Point Distribution 
 
As noted above, I analyzed the distribution of point types according to division between the local 
landform type of the site, and the subregion of the broader Salish Sea region that the site was 
associated with. By comparing the local site landform type, I hoped to determine if there was a pattern 
in the types of points that could be associated with specific landforms, possibly due to the different 
activities conducted in different areas, such as terrestrial hunting at inland sites or the hunting of marine 
mammals at coastal or island sites. In examining subregions, I hoped to potentially gain greater insight in 
how different groups across the Salish Sea region related their choices in projectile points to the 
multiple landform types of their local environment.  
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Proportion of Arrows by Local Site Geography. The most notable changes when examining 
point proportions by site geography are that mainland river sites show a substantial increase after 1500 
BP (see Figure 5.7 a and b). Mainland coastal sites showed a roughly constant proportion of arrow points 
throughout the periods in which they are documented, with a few outliers. Mainland inland sites show a 
substantial increase after 2500, and then disappear from the data set entirely. This could simply be a 
reflection of the available sites in the area, as these two sites, SN100 and the Marymoor park sites, are 
the only sites in the dataset used by Rorabaugh that are a significant distance away from the somewhat 
open waters of the Salish Sea region. 
 
 
Figure 5.7a and b. Average proportion of arrow points over time by the local geography of the site, 
expressed in 500ybp intervals, both the whole of the dataset (a) and the sites with 10 or more points (b). 
Error bars are 1 standard deviation. 
 
The only major outlier to the trend of arrow points increasing across the period of study is the presence 
of points assigned as arrows prior to the hypothesized introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish 
Sea region at 3500 (Rorabaugh and Fulkerson 2015). Rorabaugh claimed these points to be fletched 
darts (Angelbeck and Cameron 2014; Hughes 1998), citing Hughes’ (1998) assertion that fletched darts 
could use smaller heads, and thus be included as arrow points when using an index that does not 
account for this. Given this, it is understandable to assume that the earlier points in the assemblage are 
























































   
welcomed. Rorabaugh’s reference to Hughes (1998) may well be appropriate, although the very fact 
that this is something that, absent of any other information, would mean that the measurement method 
could only be effectively used in an area with a long record of ethnographically or wet-site associated 
point types with clear differentiation between arrows and fletched darts or other transitional 
technologies. As this assumption has been imbedded in the data collected by Rorabaugh, I have carried 
forward using it in my analysis, but this is something that I really believe needs to be more thoroughly 
discussed.  
 
In any case, disproportionately small sample sizes from this period mean that this is a discussion of 11 
projectile points from 3 site components. It is unlikely that a feasibly large sample size could be 
compiled to differentiate fletched darts from arrows given currently known point assemblages. While 
this data does show dramatic changes from 6000 to 5000 BP, this is most likely due to the relatively 
small sample size of both points and sites available from those periods, as mentioned earlier (see Table 
5.2).  
 
I ran an ANOVA test for the average proportion of arrows by local site geography. The ANOVA test for 
this information returned a p value well in excess of 0.05,(see Table 5.12) meaning that overall variation 
in the proportion of arrows by local site geography was not statistically significant. This supported by 
another test of the data, which discounted the data of the Mainland Inland sites, and the sites from 
prior to 3500bp, and further reinforced by the testing of the filtered components with 10 or more points 






   
Table 5.12. The means, standard deviations and errors, and ANOVA test results for the average 
proportion of arrows by site local geography.  
  
N Mean SD SE 
 
Island 33 0.379 0.272 0.047 
 
Mainland Coastal 27 0.408 0.290 0.056 
 
Mainland Inland 2 0.795 0.290 0.205 
 
Mainland River 14 0.380 0.341 0.091 
 
      
ANOVA Summary DF SS MS F P 
Between 3 0.335 0.112 1.306 0.279 
Within 72 6.148 0.085 
  
Total 75 6.483 
   
Table 5.13 a and b. ANOVA test of the filtered data from Table 5.6, both the whole dataset (a) and the 
components with 10 or more points (b).  
N Mean STDev Stderror 
 
Island 31 0.4 0.267 0.048 
 
Mainland Coastal 26 0.424 0.283 0.056 
 
Mainland River 10 0.459 0.357 0.113 
 
      
ANOVA Analysis DF SS MS F P 
Between 2 0.028 0.014 0.168 0.846 
Within 64 5.295 0.083 
  
Total 66 5.323 
   
  
N Mean STDev Stderror 
 
Island 17 0.437 0.165 0.04 
 
Mainland Coastal 9 0.406 0.139 0.046 
 
Mainland River 5 0.531 0.306 0.137 
 
      
ANOVA Analysis DF SS MS F P 
Between 2 0.052 0.026 0.751 0.481 
Within 28 0.965 0.035 
  
Total 30 1.017 
   
 
These results are perhaps unsurprising, given that different groups would use sites in more than one 
area of local geography, meaning that the tool technologies of a given group would have the potential to 
be distributed across an area covering multiple landform types. A more effective use of this method 
93 
   
might be in the analysis of vastly different geographic areas, such as the Columbia Plateau compared to 
the Salish Sea region. 
 
I ran a series of regressions between the projectile point counts and the arrow proportions by cultural 
phase to examine the effect of sample size on arrow proportion. In the Charles and Locarno Beach 
phases, the average proportion of arrows increased with sample size, while the average proportion of 
arrows decreased with sample size in the Marpole and Gulf of Georgia phases (Table 5.14).  
 
Table 5.14. Regression results between the number of projectile points associated with a site component 
and the proportion of arrow points at that component, separated by cultural phase. 
Cultural Phase Linear regression results of sites with >=10 points 
Charles ŷ = 0.03958X - 0.19583 (n=3) 
Locarno Beach ŷ = 0.00038X + 0.36789 (n= 9) 
Marpole ŷ = -0.00056X + 0.51223 (n= 16) 
Gulf of Georgia ŷ = -0.00232X + 0.6491 (n= 8) 
 
In the case of the Charles phase This could simply be a reflection of the relatively small amount of both 
points and site components in the Charles phase, as the filtering of sites with less than ten points halved 
the available number of sites to analyze, and all of the filtered out sites lacked ‘arrow’ or alleged 
fletched dart points (Table 5.15). 
 
Table 5.15. Site components from the Charles phase, with the number of projectile points and the 
proportion of arrow point value. 
Site component Number of Points Proportion of points 
considered arrows 
45WH34-1 16 0.4375 
DeRt2-2 10 0.1 
DfRu8-1 5 0 
DgRr1-1 1 0 
DgRr2-2 1 0 




   
Regardless, this shows that the projectile points of the Charles phase warrant further study, in order to 
determine the validity of claims that the small points represented are in fact fletched dart points, or if 
the projectile point timeline needs to be reassessed. If these points are in fact arrow points, their almost 
complete absence after 5000 and before 3500ybp needs to be addressed. In doing so, it must be kept in 
mind that lithic points were only one of the forms of point technology used in the Salish Sea region, and 
it is possible that any gapes in the lithic record could potentially be explained by the adoption of a 
corresponding set of bone points. Regardless, further dated lithic points would be quite useful in 
providing greater context. 
 
Proportion of Arrows by Merged Region. I chose to merge the Gulf Island sites and the San Juan 
islands sites into one larger group, as well as the Fraser delta sites and the Northwest Washington sites 
into one larger group, due to the geographical proximity and similarity of the regions, combined with 
the relatively small sample sizes for some of these regions, Northwest Washington in particular (see 
Table 5.5). By doing this, I hoped to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the regions. Sites from 
the Puget Sound have a higher proportion of arrows, than do sites from other regions. However, there 
are still more points overall from the sites in other regions (see Table 5.5). The other regions, while 
there are occasional increases in the average arrow proportion, never reach the same level as the 
percentages from the Puget Sound Region (Figure 5.8). 
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Figure 5.8 a and b. Average arrow proportion by time and region: all phases. both the whole of the 
dataset (a) and the sites with 10 or more points (b). Error bars are 1 standard deviation. 
 
The difference in point proportions is even more noticeable when comparing the Puget Sound region to 
the rest of the Salish Sea region in aggregate (Rest Of the Salish Sea: ROSS)(Figure 5.9a and b).  While 
there was some variance in the values of the ROSS throughout the period of study, the ROSS arrow 
proportions never exceed those of the Puget Sound subregion. A t-test between the regions was 
significant at a 0.05 level (t=4.39. N=76 p=<.001). I tested two more times, testing first only the means 
from 3500bp and onward, the periods in which I have data from both areas, and then from 2500bp and 








































































Figure 5.9 a and b. Puget Sound and ROSS Arrow proportions: all phases, both the whole of the dataset 
(a) and the sites with 10 or more points (b). Error bars are 1 standard deviation. 
 
The results for the 3500bp test were (t=4.125, n=67 p- <.001) The results for the 2500bp test were  (t= 
4.023, n=57 p=<.001). Both results were significant at .05, indicating among other things that this 
difference was not due to a difference in sample sizes among the subregional datasets. In addition, 
when the whole dataset was tested again after filtering out the components with less than 10 projectile 
points, it remained significant  (t= 4.105, N=36, p=<.001). this significance remained when filtering out 
the sites from prior to 3500ybp (t=3.933, N=33, p=<.001) and 2500ybp (t=3.835 N=25 p=<.001)  
These results indicate that there is a clear and significant regional difference between the Puget Sound 
and the other combined subregions of the Salish Sea region. 
 
Arrow Proportions by Cultural Phase. I conducted pairwise t-tests of each of the main cultural 
phases represented in the dataset, the Charles, Locarno Beach, Marpole, and Gulf of Georgia phases, in 
order to determine if there was a significant difference in the projectile points of the three phases 






























































Table 5.16. T-tests comparing the proportion arrow for the site components of the main cultural phases 
of study. 
Phase and years BP Charles and Locarno 
Beach  
Locarno Beach and 
Marpole  
Marpole and Gulf of 
Georgia 
t-test results t=-2.59 n=17 p=.01 t=-0.56 n=47 p=.29 t=-1.60 n=58 p=.058 
 
Table 5.17. T-tests comparing the proportion of arrows for the ROSS site components of the main cultural 
phases of study. 
Phase and 
years BP ROSS 
Charles (5000-4000) 
and Locarno Beach 
(3500-2500) 
Locarno Beach (3500-2500) and 
Marpole (2500-1500) 
Marpole(2500-1500) 
and Gulf of 
Georgia(1500-500) 
t-test results t=-2.38 n=14 p=.016 t=-0.033 n=39 p= .49 t=-1.67 n=48 p= .051 
 
The only t-test which showed a significant difference in proportion of arrows was the test between the 
Charles and Locarno Beach Phases (See Table 5.15). This corroborates Rorabaugh and Fulkerson’s (2015) 
date of 3500bp as the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region. However, due to the 
very small sample size of points and site components in the Charles phase it is uncertain exactly how 
strongly this conclusion should be supported.  
Given the previously noted difference in the Puget Sound subregion compared to the ROSS, I performed 
these t-tests again, filtering out the assemblages from the Puget Sound subregion (see Table 5.16). 
 
While the results do support Rorabaugh’s conclusion of the introduction of the bow and arrow taking 
place roughly in 3500bp, it also may call into question exactly how much the data from the Charles 
phase can be relied on. The relationship between the Charles and the later phases is being extrapolated 
from a small handful of points compared to the later phases. While this relationship might hold up given 
the inclusion of further points in the dataset, it also might produce results similar to later phases. The 
lack of dated pre-3500bp points among the compiled points from the Puget Sound subregion in 
particular is quite troubling given the dramatic difference in the proportion of arrows in the 
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assemblages. Documentation of earlier sites and assemblages would be very welcome in determining if 
the subregional differences in projectile point usage were also prevalent prior to the introduction of the 
bow and arrow to the broader Salish Sea region.  
 
Analysis of Site Defensibility 
 
Much like with the projectile point assemblages, I analyzed the relative site defensibility by both the 
local site landform type, and the specific subregion of the Salish Sea region that site was associated with. 
One additional complication with the measurement of site defensibility is that sites could have multiple 
periods of occupation, potentially skewing the weight of averages over time in their favor. As the points 
associated with a site could change while the defensibility of the site did not,  it was worthwhile to 
analyze sites both in aggregate and only examining their first component, so as to better see the effects 
of multicomponent sites.  
 
Analysis of the Defensibility of the Site First Occupation Periods. The previous analysis of the 
data was undertaken without regard for the effect that sites with multiple phases of occupation; i.e. 
multiple point scores against a single set of defensibility values would have on the overall correlation. 
Multiple point assemblages would be compared against a single defensibility values, despite the 
possibility that human modification of the site during its periods of occupation, such as the addition of 
trench embankments, would have changed the overall defensibility of the site, something that would 
not be accounted for under Bocinsky’s (2014) method as it would not directly impact the elevation or 
sightlines of the site. Therefore, I narrowed down the dataset to include only the point assemblages that 
were the oldest recorded for the site. This would have the effect of showing the material culture that 
was in use during the first occupation of the site, and if/how the material culture of the time impacted 
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the choice of location for settlements. Examining only the earliest component eliminated 33 
components from the dataset, leaving 43 components to compare (Figure 5.10).  One of the clearest 
patterns in this data is that the removal of later components removes some of the site components that 
have the largest impact on the overall proportion of arrows for their given 500 year interval. For the 




Counts of single vs multicomponent sites by 500-year interval  
Orange = singe-phase sites, Gray = first phases of multicomponent sites, Blue = subsequent phases of 
multicomponent sites 
 
This means that the analysis of defensibility of later phases has the potential to be skewed by outliers 
more easily than the earlier phases, due to fewer sites being analyzed. This would also imply that 
outside of direct correlations, proportion of arrows and average maximum defensibility are best 
analyzed in two different ways. Analyzing components of the first occupation period only for a given site 
works for defensibility, because the defensibility will not change over subsequent components. 
Conversely, the proportion of arrows will change, and thus all assemblages could be included without 





























   
Analysis by Site Landform Type. I classified site components into categories based on their local 
geography. These categories were:  
1.) Island sites,  
2.) mainland coastal sites, defined as being directly adjacent to the Salish Sea, 
3.) mainland river sites, sites that bordered a major river but not the Salish Sea, including sites in 
the Fraser River Delta, and  
4.) Inland sites, those with no direct access to a navigable body of water. 
One complication found using this data was the very small and incomplete sample sizes involved. There 
were only 2 mainland inland sites in the whole assemblage, and seven mainland river sites (Table 5.18). 
 
Table 5.18. Sample size of earliest components within my landform categories, as separated by 500 year 
intervals per Rorabaugh (2015).  
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 6000 Total 
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The only interval of time with examples of all four landform categories was 2000 BP, making it difficult 
to draw broader conclusions from the defensibility data in this manner (Figure 5.11 a and b). 
 
 
Figure 5.11a and b. Average maximum site defensibility over time by site geography, both the whole of 




I ran an ANOVA test to see whether the data would show a clear difference in the defensibility of the 
landforms.  This test returned a p value of >0.05, as did a subsequent test of only the components with 
10 or more points (see Table 5.19 a and b). This, combined with the issues of sample size, leads me to 












































































   
significant differences. This was backed up by my performing another t-test, this one measuring the 
mainland inland sites compared to all of the other categories (t=. 1.222 n=43 p=.114). This test showed 
no significant difference between the average maximum defensibility of the mainland inland sites and 
those bordering a large body of water. One final t-test was conducted between the three categories of 
mainland site and island sites. The results of this test (t= -0.618 n=43 p= .270) show that there was not a 
significant difference between island and mainland sites. An ANOVA test of only the 2000bp category 
components was not possible due to there only being one mainland inland site in this category. While 
the site in question had a higher defensibility rating than the mean ratings of the other three categories, 
a larger sample size of Mainland Inland sites could reveal if this is an outlier or not.  
 
Table 5.19 a and b ANOVA test results for the average maximum defensibility as divided by site local 
geography, both the whole of the first occupation components (a) and the site components with 10 or 
more points (b).  
N Mean STDev Stderror 
 
Island 17 57.647 7.905 1.917 
 
Mainland Coastal 17 59.235 7.504 1.820 
 
Mainland Inland 2 64.5 2.121 1.5 
 
Mainland River 7 57 4.865 1.839 
 
      
ANOVA Analysis DF SS MS F P 
Between 3 109.302 36.434 0.694 1.194 
Within 39 2047.429 52.498 
  
Total 42 2156.731 
   
  
N Mean STDev Stderror 
 
Island 7 58.571 7.367 2.785 
 
Mainland Coastal 5 60.8 4.324 1.934 
 
Mainland Inland 2 64.5 2.121 1.5 
 
Mainland River 3 57.667 5.033 2.906 
 
      
ANOVA Analysis DF SS MS F P 
Between 3 73.378 24.459 0.698 0.570 
Within 13 455.680 35.052 
  
Total 16 529.058 
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Defensibility of the Puget Sound subregion versus the ROSS. The Puget Sound subregion 
appeared to have an average maximum defensibility over time that varied in some ways from ROSS (see 
Figure 5.12 a and b). this is backed up by a t-test of the components form the first phase of occupation 
of all sites that showed there was a significant variation in the average maximum defensibility between 
the two regions (t=1.69948. n=43, p=.049) However, there are no clear patterns of change over time for 
either the Puget Sound or the ROSS (Figure 5.12 a and b), meaning that this analysis does not show any 
single linear trend over time.  
 
 
Figure 5.12 a and b. Average Maximum Site Defensibility over time, comparing the Puget Sound Region 
against the Rest of The Salish Sea (ROSS) , both the whole of the dataset (a) and the sites with 10 or 









































































   
 
 
Given the small sample size of Puget Sound subregion sites (see Table 5.20), these significant differences 
could simply be reflecting the values of individual outliers rather than a group of sites showing a broader 
trend.  A larger sample of Puget Sound Site components would be very helpful in determining the extent 
of the variation compared to the ROSS. 
 
Table 5.20. Sample size of earliest components within Rorabaugh’s (2015) regions and my merged 
regions. Rorabaugh’s regions are shown as subsets of my three merged regions.  
Geographic setting Count of  site components 
Total ROSS 37 
Islands 16    
    Gulf Islands 8 
    San Juan Islands 8 
Northern Mainland 22 
    Fraser Valley 12 
    NW Washington 9 
Puget Sound 6 
    Puget Sound 6 
Grand Total 43 
Site Defensibility by Cultural Phase. I examined the defensibility of sites by grouping them 
according to their earliest occupied phase into the three main cultural phases covering the period of 
study, the Locarno beach, Marpole, and Gulf of Georgia phases. The Archaic and Charles phases were 
omitted from the latter study due to low sample size of sites, leaving only the Locarno beach, Marpole 
and Gulf of Georgia phases. The ANOVA tests showed that there was not a significant variation between 
the average maximum defensibility of the three periods in study, this was supported by another ANOVA 





   
 
 
Table 5.21 a and b. ANOVA test results for the average maximum defensibility across cultural phases, 
both the whole of the dataset (a)  and the site components with 10 or more points (b).  
N Mean STDev STDerror 
 
Locarno Beach 7 58.857 9.371 3.542 
 
Marpole 22 58.682 6.335 1.351 
 
Gulf of Georgia 8 57.875 7.809 2.761 
 
      
ANOVA 
Analysis 
DF SS MS F P 
Between 2 4.684 2.342 0.044 0.957 
Within 34 1796.511 52.839 
  
Total 36 1801.195 
   
 
  
N Mean STDev Stderror 
 
Locarno Beach 9 60.444 8.095 2.698 
 
Marpole 16 58.063 6.688 1.672 
 
Gulf of Georgia 8 56.625 5.097 1.802 
 
      
ANOVA Analysis DF SS MS F P 
Between 2 64.6 32.3 0.704 0.503 
Within 30 1377.037 45.901 
  
Total 32 1441.637 
   
 
Given this data, it is clear that the average maximum site defensibility did not change in a statistically 
significant manner across these periods. It is possible that the lack of any major long term change in 
defensibility could be an indication of either a reliance on landscape modifications such as fortifications 
which have not been archaeologically preserved, or that a location’s defensibility was much less of a 
priority than other factors such as the location of resources such as salmon runs and clam beds, as well 
as access to travel routes throughout the region. A certain level of vulnerability in the location of villages 
and other activity areas may have been an acceptable price to pay in exchange for access to the 
resources that would have allowed individuals and groups to survive and gain status through means 
other than conflict.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 
While analysis of the aggregated assemblages and site components showed a correlation between high 
proportions of arrows and high site defensibility (see Table 5.6), this was not the case when only the 
assemblages with 10 or more projectile points were measured. The t-tests conducted with the point 
assemblages indicate that the bow and arrow was likely introduced in the Locarno Beach phase (see 
Table 5.16), while the only phase that showed any significant relationship between proportion of arrows 
and maximum defensibility was the Gulf of Georgia phase (see Table 5.7), and it was negative. This 
would seem to indicate that the introduction of the bow and arrow to the Salish Sea region had no 
direct impact on site defensibility in the Salish Sea region. In addition, analysis showed that there was no 
meaningful difference in either average maximum defensibility or average proportion of arrows as 
separated by local site geography (see Tables 5.12 a and b, 5.19 a and b). 
 
Once the site components with less than 10 projectile points were filtered out, the Gulf of Georgia was 
the only phase with a significant association between defensibility and the average arrow proportion, 
with high maximum defensibility being strongly associated with low proportions of arrow points from 
associated assemblages.   The increase in defensibility and the decrease in proportion of arrow in the 
Gulf of Georgia phase could be seen as a reflection of changes in social organization and the increase in 
regional population of the Gulf of Georgia phase and leading up to ethnographic reports of contact 
(Croes and Hackenberger 1988, Angelbeck 2009). If more defensible constructions were made in more 
defensible locations, there would be less of a need to rely heavily on weapons such as the bow and 
arrow that were more efficient in intergroup conflict. However, as the association in the Gulf of Georgia 
phase is primarily caused by three site components in the San Juan islands that had high defensibility 
and low proportions of arrows, this may instead be a reflection of the higher proportion of marine 
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resources that these sites would have access to, and the existing, non-arrow tools used to harvest these 
resources.  It may be worthwhile to conduct a more thorough study of defensibility on a subregional 
basis, in order to see if there were changes that did not carry over throughout the broader Salish Sea 
region. 
 
In addition, the drastically differing point proportion results that have been gathered from the Puget 
Sound as compared to the rest of the Salish Sea region suggests that more emphasis be put on the 
analysis of the Puget Sound as a subregion when conducting analysis of the Salish Sea as a whole. 
Previously, analysis of the Puget Sound region has been used as part of a broader analysis of the Salish 
Sea region as a whole (e.g. Angelbeck (2009), with some exceptions such as individual site reports 
(Campbell 1981, Chatters 1988, Lewarch et al. 2002,) and the documentation of point sequences such as 
that conducted by Croes et al. (2008), as well as Carlson and Magne (2008). Much of the data that 
specifically examines the Puget Sound region on a broader basis is quite old, (Bryan 1955, 1963, Smith 
1907), meaning that newer research projects were not included in the subregion-level analysis. 
 
Any further studies of the Salish Sea region that involve the analysis of sites from the geographic 
subregions mentioned above, such as the Fraser Delta, San Juan Islands, or Puget Sound should follow a 
similar pattern to Rorabaugh’s (2015) research, where the data points from different subregions could 
be differentiated from each other for the purposes of ascertaining if any major changes in the 
aggregated data were caused by the disproportionate impact of one subregion in particular, rather than 
the broader Salish Sea region as a whole. By differentiating the subregions in this manner, it will allow 




   
 
The Puget Sound as a unique subregion within the Salish Sea region 
 
The statistically significant difference in point proportions in the Puget Sound subregion compared to 
the rest of the Salish Sea (see Figure 5.9 a and b) may indicate that the tool use practices of the peoples 
of the Puget Sound region were different enough from that of their northern neighbors to result in 
significant differences in their use of projectile points. While this conclusion cannot be definitely 
assumed to apply for bone and lithic points, if an area has arrow points of one material, it can indicate 
that the baseline arrow technology was able to be used with point types not directly shown in the 
archaeological record. 
These inter-subregion differences may simply indicate that the bow and arrow was used primarily as a 
tool for hunting, rather than a weapon against other groups, or that raiding and other forms of 
intergroup conflict were infrequent enough that site defensibility was not considered a higher priority. 
However, the predominance of the bow and arrow in the Puget Sound subregion as compared to ROSS 
may indicate a key difference in how the inhabitants of the Puget Sound subregion conducted 
themselves in both subsistence hunting and intergroup conflict. In areas where there was a larger 
framework of societies that could be used for both coordinated hunting and coordinated action during 
the course of intergroup conflict, there may have been less of an advantage to rely on the bow and 
arrow. If the Puget Sound region adopted the bow and arrow at a much higher proportional level than 
the ROSS, this may be an indication that the same sorts of social networks that could be used for 
hunting and defense were much less relied on than in the rest of the Salish Sea region, even if they were 
present. The use of the bow and arrow in individual hunting would enable the bypassing of the older 
group-hunting social networks, and reinforce new ones based around individual prestige shared on kin 
lines (Angelbeck and Cameron 2014, Rorabaugh 2019). 
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Angelbeck and Cameron (2014) suggest that the bow and arrow is more suited to individual hunting 
than the thrown spear or dart, due to its more portable nature and greater accuracy at distance. The 
bow and arrow is more accurate at range than the thrown spear or dart (Bettinger 2013), which is yet 
another argument in favor of its use in intergroup conflict. Angelbeck and Cameron (2014) also make the 
point that the bow and arrow would have been quicker to use than the thrown spear. When both 
factors are combined, the bow and arrow allow for more rapid acquisition of targets and quicker follow 
up shots, at longer range than the thrown spear or dart. These advantages allow an individual 
combatant with a bow and arrow to be more proficient in fighting than an individual using a thrown 
spear or dart. The differences on the individual level between users of these weapons would have been 
compounded by the addition of other combatants and would have meant that barring extreme cases it 
would have been a major error to attempt to engage those armed with bows and arrows while armed 
with thrown spears or darts. In areas where there were less established groups to aid in the 
coordination of defense, it would be highly advantageous for individuals and smaller groups to adopt 
the bow and arrow as their primary ranged weapon in interpersonal and intergroup conflict. The 
advantages of the bow and arrow over thrown spears and darts would make it a more effective choice 









   
Areas for Further Research 
 
One of the clearest areas where more research could be done is in the pre-3500 BP projectile point 
record of the Puget Sound subregion.  While the assemblages aggregated by Rorabaugh are as 
exhaustive as he was able to find and analyze in the course of his research, (Rorabaugh 2015), any future 
finds of projectile points in the Puget Sound subregion would potentially go a long way in establishing 
the validity of lumping the subregion into the broader Salish Sea region when discussing the use of the 
bow and arrow.  Another area for further research would be the presence of arrow points prior to 
Rorabaugh’s date for the introduction of the bow and arrow. While Rorabaugh claims that these are 
fletched dart points, it is certainly something that could use a second look. This is another area in which 
a larger sample of early projectile points could remove an area of ambiguity. 
 
Tying into the issue of sample size, another clear area for more research is in the holistic examination of 
both bone and lithic points in the same research project. 
While there are potential issues with using the same criteria on tools made from two quite different 
materials, examination of assemblages in tandem could help to fill in the gaps of one assemblage with 
the results of another. One major hurdle for this project is that anyone who did this would have to 
define projectile points and clarify how they will treat harpoon points and other bone points that are 
different in design than stone points. Improvements in cataloguing software and data processing could 
make this more feasible in the future. 
 
While Martindale and Supernant’s methods may provide more conclusive measurements of defensibility 
when used on sites that have a robust enough record of excavation to support them, (Martindale and 
Supernant 2009; Cookson 2013), as they would be able to show how landscape modifications can impact 
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the defensibility of a given site over multiple phases.  However, they are of relatively limited use when 
applied to sites without a comprehensive knowledge of the extent of site features. Bocinsky (2014)’s 
method is much more effective when examining the entirety of a broader region, and examining sites 
within this broader regional context. 
 
The use of Bocinsky’s process establishes a baseline for the analysis of defensibility that can be 
supplemented with contextual information for sites outside of the norm. As the defensibility raster 
extends throughout the Salish Sea region, it would be relatively easy to add more sites and associated 
point assemblages into the overall dataset. Adding more point assemblages and their associated sites to 
the existing dataset could make the relationship between the introduction of the bow and arrow and 
intergroup conflict in the region much clearer. In theory, Bocinsky’s method is scalable to work in other 
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yes Total Grand 
Total 











500 2 5 
 
5 7 
1000 5 8 1 9 14 
1500 
 
6 4 10 10 
2000 11 6 5 11 22 





1 4 5 5 
3500 
 
2 3 5 5 
4000 
 
1 1 2 2 
4500 
  
3 3 3 
5000 
  
1 1 1 
6000 
  
1 1 1 
Grand Total 21 32 23 55 76 
 
 
 
